A Congregational Church Is a Catholike Visible Church.

OR

An Examination of M. *Hudson* his Vindication concerning the Integrality of the Catholike Visible Church.

Wherein also satisfaction is given to what M. CAWDREY writes touching that subject, in his Review of M. HOOKER's Survey of Church Discipline.

By Samuel Stone, *Teacher to the Church of Christ at* Hartford *in* New-England.

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To the Reader.

IN most Controversies, though in their issues and superstructures they rise to a marvelous height, yet in the beginning and bottom ground, the difference is not great. So in this, though the differences and contests, not so much of principles, as of spirits and persons; partly through inward corruptions and prejudices, together with the secret wrath of God for them; and probably also, through Jesuitical bellows, blowing these unhappy flames, are now grown to a woful height, to desperate distances and heart burnings; yet the foundation is in this seemingly slight Logical question, an Ecclesia institutа sit genus an integrum? Reverend and Learned M. Hudson conceives it to be totum integrale; M. Hooker to be totum universale. That this is the bottom question hence appears, that the other contrary apprehensions in Church discipline, are mostly the contrary consequences and deductions flowing from these two opposite principles.

Nor is it strange that so great a question in Divinity should border so neer upon the principles of Logick; for all the Arts are nothing else but the beams and rays of the Wisdom of the first Being in the Creatures, shining, and reflecting thence, upon the glass of man's understanding; and as from Him they come, so to him they tend: the circle of Arts is a Deo ad Deum. Hence there is an affinity and kindred of Arts (omnes Artes vinculo & cognatione quadam inter se continentur; Cicer. pro Arch. Poet.) which is according to the reference and subordination of their particular ends, to the utmost and last end: One makes use of another, one serves to another, till they all reach and return to Him, as Rivers to the Sea, whence they flow.

Now Logick is of most general use. Divinity ratione finis; for it is the universal end of all: physica ratione χτήσεως; for every art riseth here: but Logick ratione χρήσεως; is most general; there is no art but useth the help of Logick; nothing can shew it self to the eye of the mind of man, but in this light. Hence mistakes in Logick are not unusual in Writers upon this subject. A man cannot apprehend M. Hooker's double consideration of the Church, as totum essentiale & organicum; nor why as totum essentiale it is Ecclesia prima, if he do not know genus and integrum and argumentum primum and ortum in Logick; nor judge his method to be other then leaping, if he do not

know the method of the first part of Logick. Nor will his proving that Christ gave the Keys to a Visible Church, entitle the Church of Boston, *or any other Church to them, unless it be also proved, that the visible Church is a* genus, *and that every individual Church, as that of* Boston, *is a* species *or part of this* genus: *Nor will it ever appear whether the visible Church be* genus *or* integrum, *till it appear what* genus *and* integrum *be.*

Hence the first part of this Discourse is taken up in clearing the nature of these and other Logical Notions: which cannot but be needful in this question, Review, c. *for M.* Cawdry *was long troubled before he could find out M.* 2. pag. 64. Hooker's *meaning, when he saith* totum essentiale, *not explaining it; though upon serious observation he found it. The Reader needs not be puzzled hereafter in that kinde, the explication is here done to his hand.*

And here by the way I am to advertise the Reader that the publishing of this discourse may perhaps be a supersedias *to any further labours, in answer to that reverend Divine. His review glanceth at some passages, not alwaies at the main and most material; when he shall strike at M.* Hooker's *whole frame and principles, he may receive an answer* πρὸς τὰς: *mean while this may suffice, meeting (though in pursuance of M.* Hudson) *with what seemes most material in the review.*

The second part of this discourse iuproving and applying the grounds laid in the former to M. Hudson's *discourse, would be wel attended by the Reader. Thou canst not judge aright till thou hast read the whole.*

If any shall attempt a reply, let me desire him to imitate this, which may be a patterne for all discourses of this nature in clearness, and succinctness, and close pursuing the point in hand, without distastful reflections and diversions from things to men. Many polemical writers are so filled with oddpangs of their spirits, as causeth a secret kind of disrelishment and offence to the Readers.

The Author hereof is one who sees about him, understands the Principles and grounds he goes upon, and therefore knowes what he saith. His relation to M. Hooker (*being Teacher of the same church*) *together with his personal abilities, caused many to judge him most meet to do this office of love to him and truth, but the fulness of his imployments, in his constant preaching, and other ways, was a sufficient plea of excuse in his judgement in his not rendring an answer to M.* Hudson's *book; yet upon the earnest desire of a friend (who was then engaged for a Voyage to* England) *to have a few lines from him touching the nature of a Catholike Visible Church (that being the first and main question betwixt M.* Hooker *and M.* Hudson; viz. *What* totum *the Visible Catholike Church is) he was induced to promise, that if he might but have a fortnight free from other service, he would (to satisfie the desire of his Friend)*

Friend) ſend after him ſome Notes upon that ſubject; which accordingly was performed by him, and is done accurately and ſtrongly, though briefly, as the ſtreights of time allotted him would permit. It was in his thoughts to have given ſome larger explication concerning the nature and diſtinction of the Church, in ſuch Propoſitions as theſe.

PROP. I. The church conſidered as the ſubject of Application, (where it is firſt to be attended) is the ſeed of Chriſt. As the ſeed of *Adam* is the ſubject of propagation, to whom his tranſgreſſion is extended; ſo the ſeed of the ſecond *Adam* are the proper ſubject of redemption, to whom it is applyed by his Spirit, *Iſa.* 53. 10.

PROP. II. The church is either Militant or Tryumphant.

PROP. III. The militant church is the number of thoſe to whom Chriſt is applyed but in part, which is therefore wreſtling with her ſpiritual enemies.

PROP. IV. The militant church is mingled with Tares, *i. e.* with ſuch who only ſeem to be the ſeed of Chriſt, *Mat.* 23. 24. to 31. and *verſ.* 37.

PROP. V. The militant church mingled with Tares, is diſtinguiſhed into congregations, and is therefore accomodated with the rule of Eccleſiaſtical policie, *Epheſ.* 2. 12.

PROP. VI. The word church uſed in the new Teſtament, ſuits moſt exactly with a congregational political viſible church.

PROP. VII. The political viſible church is diſtinguiſhed in reſpect of the times thereof. It was firſt in a family, then in a nation, laſtly among al nations.

PROP. VIII. The political viſible church among all Nations, is properly called a catholike viſible church.

It was alſo in his purpoſe, had there been time, to have given ſome reaſons of his diſſent from M. Hudſon's *apprehenſion, concerning the viſible headſhip of Chriſt. It is moſt true, that Chriſt is head of the Church as God-man: It is alſo true, that Chriſt is viſible according to his humane nature; but that is not conceived ſufficient to render him the* viſible head of the viſible church. *Chriſt is head of the inviſible church as God-man; Chriſt God-man is monarch of the world. But he is not the viſible head of the inviſible church, nor the viſible monarch of the world. Chriſt hath a more ſpecial influence into his church by his ſpirit, but his ſpirit is inviſible. Every inviſible member of Chriſt in the world, is not a viſible member, yet every inviſible member is a viſible man.*

I am ſorry to ſtay thee any longer in the porch; only there are three ſad hindrances of light in theſe points 1. *Pride.* 2. *Wiſdom.* 3. *Prejudice. Let me therefore leave upon thy heart three words of advice, if ever thou wouldſt ſee the beauty of the Lord in his Temple, and the way of his houſe, or get the bleſſing and good of this, or any other good help for that end.* 1. *To*

1. *To be much in humiliation. It is a moſt remarkable paſſage of* Ezekiel 43. 10. If they be aſhamed of all that they have done, ſhew them the houſe, the faſhion and forms thereof, all the ordinances and laws thereof, &c. *Oh take heed there be not ſome unmortified unlamented ſecret luſt to darken thine eyes from ſeeing theſe bleſſed truths of God.* Deus ineffabili lege ſpargit pœnales cæcitates ſuper illicitas cupiditates (Auguſt. Confeſs.) *It would make one tremble to ſee how dreadful the revenges of God whether for perſonal pollutions or for ſinful compliances with the former devices and ways of men in the things of his houſe, or for ſecret contempt of the ſimplicity and power of the Goſpel, are gone forth in penal blindneſſes and other blaſting ſtrokes upon the ſouls of ſome in theſe times: They that will not ſee the viſions of their own hearts, and of the ſecret diſtempers, and ſins, and plagues there, mourning alſo for them; God will not let them ſee the viſions of himſelf, and of his power and glory in his Sanctuary;* They ſhall ask the way to Sion weeping, Jer. 50. 4, 5. going, and weeping as they go.

2. *Be not over wiſe, plainly thus; Seek not to accomodate the government of the Church to the wiſdom and policy of Civil Governments amongſt men. We ſee that crookning the Goſpel to the unpurged relicks of the wiſdom of Nature, hath been the ancient plague and ſeduction of* Arminians; *Let not the ſame diſtemper pervert thy thonghts in this matter. To conceive there are ſome reſerved caſes for Chriſt himſelf to come in almightily by his owne eſpecial guidance, to over-rule in particular Congregations, as he hath done in that way of advice; why is not this as ſafe, as to place the help in appeals and claſſical ſubordinations, where the ſame objection returns at laſt as ſtrong as ever: For if the National or General Councel wrong a man, as they have often done, there is no relief for him upon earth. That that's uſeful in Civil Courts and Judicatories, as Appeals may be, is ever hurtful and pernicious in Church diſcipline, if not commanded by Chriſt, but prudentially taken up.*

3. *Beware of prejudices againſt the way and works of God.*

1. *Againſt the way, Therefore I make the ſame requeſt with* Bucer *in another caſe,* ut pari ſtudio legas utriuſq; partis ſcripta. *M.* Brightman *conceives from.* Rev. 17. 3. *that ſome faithful ones in a wilderneſs ſhall make the moſt full diſcovery of the myſterie of iniquity in all its abominations;* clariorem adhuc lucem ſolitudo dabit, haud veniet e deſerto nova ignominia &c. *which words might have been lookt upon as trifles, had they dropt from ſome idle Pen, but not from his. It is certain, the practiſe of the Churches in* New-England *gives light enough to clear the Congregational way from the moſt of thoſe miſpriſions and injurious miſrepreſentations that are caſt upon it. Their conſultation Synod in the opinion time, was bleſt of*

Bucer conrr. Latom.

God

God for their conviction, and clearing the Country of them, no leſſer then if the Synod had aſſumed the higheſt jurisdiction. The miſchievous conſequences and ſad effects which are alledged, are either meer miſtakes and miſreports in matter of fact, or fallaciæ non cauſæ pro cauſa. *they riſe not from the Congregational Principles. Either come unprejudiced in thy inquiries and ſearches after truth, or thou wilt never find it.*

2. *Againſt the works of God, which do certainly ſpeak ſomthing both in* England *and* Scotland *to ſuch as have hearing hearts, and are not eſpouſed to any Intereſt. How precious the Liberties of his people are to him, who hath bought them with his own blood, hath never been more abundantly and eminently diſcovered then in the dreadful changes and revolutions of Providence in theſe Nations, and in theſe days wherein we live. The Lord Jeſus is of late gone forth into the world,* with jealouſie for Sion, and with a great jealouſie for Jeruſalem, to ſtill the enemy, and the avenger, *to vindicate the cauſe and controverſie of his people, and to break the yokes of her oppreſſors, that* the Virgin of Iſrael may return to Sion, and be adorned with her Timbrels as in the days of old. *This is the deſirgne he hath in hand. And rather then men ſhall hinder him when he is on his way and upon the wing in his travels of love and glory to his people, he is pleaſed we ſee to* break the mountaines in peeces *when they ſtand in the way of his revenge and holineſs, and to* bath his ſword in *the blood of* heathen, *even of profeſſing people. The Father of light enlighten and enable all the Saints to cloſe with him, both in the way of his worſhip, and in the way of his works.*

Samuel Mather.

To my Reverend Dear Brother, *M.* Samuel Stone,

Teacher of the Church at HARTFORD.

HOw well (dear Brother) art thou called *Stone*?
Joh. 1.42. As ſometimes Chriſt did *Simon Cephas* own.
A *Stone* for ſolid firmneſs, fit to rear
A part in *Zions* wall: and it upbear.
Joſh. 15.6. & 18.17. Like *Stone* of *Bohan*, Bounds fit to deſcribe,
'Twixt Church and Church, as that 'twixt Tribe and Tribe.
1 Sam 7.12. Like *Samuel's Stone*, erſt *Eben-Ezer* hight;
To tell the Lord hath helpt us with his might.
1 Sam. 17. 49, 50. Like *Stone* in *Davids* ſling, the head to wound
Of that huge Giant-Church, (ſo far renownd)
Hight the Church-Catholike, Oecumenical,
Or at the loweſt compaſs, National;
Yet Poteck, Viſible, and of ſuch a faſhion,
As may or Rule a world or Rule a Nation.
Which though it be ery'd up unto the Skys,
By Philiſtims and Iſralites likewiſe;
Yet ſeems to me to be too neer a kin
Unto the Kingdom of the *Man* of *ſin*:
In frame, and ſtate, and conſtitution,
Rev. 13. Like to the *firſt beaſt* in the *Revelation*.
Which was as large as Roman empire wide,
And Ruled *Rome*, and all the world beſide.
Go on (good Brother) Gird thy Sword with might,
Fight the Lord's Battels, Plead his Churches Right.
To Brother *Hooker*, thou art next a kin,
By Office-Right thou muſt his pledge Redeem.
Take thou the double portion of his ſpirit,
Run on his Race, and then his Crown inherit.
Now is the time when Church is militant,
Time haſt'neth faſt when it ſhall be Tryumphant.

JOHN COTTON.

A Congregational Church, is a Catholike Visible Church.

IN this disquisition I shall attend two things;

First, the explication of some Rules concerning *Genus*, or *Totum Genericum*.

Secondly, The Application of those rules to the question in hand.

In the Explication, I shall labour briefly to open the Fundamental Rules concerning *genus* and *species*; and then build some conclusions upon those Foundations, or deduce some Consectaries from those Principles.

In the Application, I shall return some answer to M. *Hudson*'s Arguments contained in his fourth chapter; and also propound some reasons tending to demonstrate, that *A Congregational Church is a Catholike Church.*

CHAPTER I.

Concerning the Definition of Genus *and* Species.

GEnus est totum partibus essentiale.

The General, or the Kind, or the general kind, is a whole essential to the parts.

Aristotle saith, it is that which is one and the same in more: that is, in more *species*. He hath other expressions to the same purpose; *viz.* that the *genus* is that, whereby those that differ are the same according to Essence; that is, have community of Essence: which is the same in substance with this definition which I have here propounded; *viz.* That *Genus* is a whole essential to his parts.

ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πλειόνων, *Aristot.*

There is another definition of *genus*, which *Aristotle* gives, and his followers have received from him, which M. *Hudson* hath taken up; *viz.* *Genus est totum quod de pluribus specie differentibus, potest prædicari in quid*; or *affirmari in questione, quid est.* That is, the *Genus* is a whole, which may be predicated or affirmed of more things differing in special kind, in the question, what is it? It is said to be predicated in *quid*, because when the question is, what is the *species?* the *genus* then must be predicated of it, in answer to it: As when the question is,

M. *Hudson* page 77.

what is *homo*? what is man? the answer must be, *Animal*, a living Creature.

This last definition is not exact;

First, Because *Genus* containeth not the whole quiddity of the thing: for, when this answer is given, Man is a living creature; there is yet no difference appearing between him and a beast; a beast is a living creature: and the question yet remaineth what living creature he is.

Secondly, It is the proper office of the definition, to explicate the quiddity of a thing, and shew what it is. *Definitio est cum explicatur quid res sit:* when the utmost bounds of the Essence of a thing are laid forth, it is then distinguished from all other things.

Thirdly, There may be *genus* where no question is made.

We shall speak somwhat briefly, tending to open the true definition of *genus*. In which we may consider, first, the thing defined; secondly, the definition.

The thing defined is

Genus] the kind or general. The word firstly and properly signifieth a Stock, Linage, Parentage, Kindred, or Family. *Genus* is used in this signification in *Acts* 4. 6. where γένος is translated (and properly) Kindred: *And as many as were of the kindred of the high Priest.* Phil. 3. 5. Paul *was* ἐκ γένους Ἰσραὴλ, *of the stock of Israel.*

Here it is taken for kind, community of Nature and Essence; As *animal* is the *genus* of Man and Beast; because the essence of living creature is common to both.

The word is translated from Families hither, by reason of similitude; because as Parents are causes of their children, so *genus* is of his *species*. And because those that are born in the same Family, and are of the same house, stock or kindred, have all things in common between themselves, as names, surnames, priviledges, &c. so in like manner *species* have a like nature in common between them; as *Socrates* and *Plato*.

The Definition is

Est totum partibus essentiale.

Genus est] *Genus* is; that is, it exists *extra Intellectum*, without the Understanding; There are universals as well as singulars, and common nature as well as special. There is a generality, universality, and community, and common nature of things, *me non cogitante*. Our understanding doth not give being to *genus*, but it is extant, and in print *in rerum naturâ*, whether we observe it or not.

Totum] a whole. This is the general nature of it, wherein it agreeth with *Integrum*. It is *totum*, a whole, because it is distributed into parts, and is the container of the parts. It is true, that there is more in the *species* then

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in the *genus*; yet the *genus* holds them together: All the parts are held together in the whole, as in the common head to which they are reduced. They all agree and meet together in the *genus*, in one common matter, and a common form, as in one point or center.

As Animality is a common *Vinculum* and Bond, containing and comprehending man and beast; they cannot but agree in that common nature, and so far they must needs agree one with another; that bond will bind them and hold them together while they have any existence or being in the world. There will be kindred and community of nature between *homo* and *brutum*, while the world stands.

Essentiale] It is a *totum* which gives essence: herein it is opposed to *Integrum*, for there the parts did give essence, matter, and form to the *Integrum*. We must not conceive that *genus* gives his community, generality, or universality to his *species*; nor that it gives to the *species* all that they have: there is more in the *species* then is in the *genus*; therefore the whole essence of the *species* is not in the *genus*. *Homo* hath a special form, which *Animal* hath not; *Homo est Animal rationale*: here is something in man besides his animality, which is added to it. It is true in this respect, *plus est in specie quàm in genere*; yet *genus* is *totum essentiale*; because it symbolically containeth the causes of the *species*, and *species* answerably the effects of the *genus*. *Genus* is *nota causarum essentialium communium*; and imitates exactly the nature of those causes: as an essential cause argueth his effect, so *genus* argueth his *species*. Hence

1. *Genus* gives *esse* to his *species*, as every cause to his effect: the *species* had never been, if it had not been for *genus*: *Sublato genere, tollitur species*, take away *animal*, and *homo* will not be; there will be no man in the world. *Homo* gives being to *Socrates*, and *Socrates* will not be, cannot be without *homo*: and as *Rachel* said, *give me children, or else I dy*; so *genus* saith, give me *species*, or else I dy. *Posito genere, necessariò ponitur aliqua species*. If *homo* be in the world, there will be *John*, *Thomas*, or some other Individuals or *species* of that kind.

2. The *genus* communicates matter and form to his parts; as the parts did give matter and form to the *Integrum* so the *genus* gives matter and form to the *species*; because it is a note of the common essential causes, which are matter and form; it therefore gives matter and common form to the *species*.

3. The *genus* communicates his whole essence to his *species*, his whole matter and form: Though it doth not bestow upon the *species* all which they have, yet it is so free-hearted, that it bestoweth his whole essence and nature, and all that it hath within it self, upon the *species*: Hence the whole essence of the *genus* is in the *species*, his whole matter and form; as whole animality

the whole matter and form of living creature is *in homine & Bruto*, in man and beast. There is nothing in the *genus* (besides his universality) which is not in the *species*. Humanity with his whole matter and form is in *Socrates* and *Plato*.

4. The *genus* communicates the same essence to all his *species*. It is a note of the common essential causes, and therefore imparts it self impartially and equally to every one of his *species*, is common to all, all have one and the same common nature in them. The same common humane nature is in *Socrates*, *Plato*, and all Individuals.

Partibus essentiale] essential to its parts; *Totum est majus qualibet suâ parte*; the whole containeth the single parts, as greater then any one of them, but containeth all, as being equal to them.

There is no *totum* consisting of one part; though the entire nature of the *genus* be in every *species*, yet not the universal nature: *Totum genus, non est nisi in cunctis speciebus*; one *species* cannot make up a *genus*: *Animal* was not made up compleat and perfect, till *homo* was created.

We have finished the explication of the definition of *genus*, the kind; and have heard how kind it is (if I may so speak) to all his *species*: We must now declare briefly what respect *species* beareth to *genus* in taking his part.

Species est pars generis] The *species* is a part of its kind; the special is a part of the general.

Species] of the old verb *Specio*, to see or behold: It signifieth properly the outward face, countenance, or a sight (*non tulit hanc speciem*, he could not abide to see that sight) a thing seen or looked upon. *Græce*, εἶδος, & ἰδέα, of εἴδω, *video*, to see: It signifieth a visible shape, fashion, shew, appearance, image, or representation; τὸ εἶδος τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ἕτερον, *the fashion of his Countenance was altered*; Luke 9. 29. ὅτε εἶδος αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἑωράκατε, *neither have ye seen his shape*. Joh. 5. 29. the same word is translated *appearance*, 1 Thes. 5. 22.

The reason of the name is, because the *genus* is seen in the *species*, in them it appeareth and sheweth his face.

Species est] the *species* is; that is, really existing in nature. The *genus* subsists in his *species*, and no where else; it is no where else to be seen or found: *Homo* is not to be seen but in *Socrates*, or *Plato*, *Alexander*, or some other Individuals which are his *species*. The *genus* being granted, doth necessarily imply the existence of the *species*.

Pars] a part is that which is contained of the whole; it is held together with some other part by the *genus*, and hath alwaies some fellow or other: for the *genus* cannot be divided into one part, but into several parts; a *species*

is

is but one piece of it. If *genus* be the whole, a *ſpecies* is a part; if *animal* be the whole, *homo* is a part.

Pars generis] *non integri*: Hereby it is diſtinguiſhed from *membrum*, for that reſpects the integral, but *ſpecies* ſtands in reference to the *genus*, and participates of his eſſence, together with other *ſpecies*. *Ariſtotle* gives the ſame definition of it. *Cicero* ſaith, it is *pars quæ generi ſubeſt*: it is *pars generis ſubjectiva, ſub icitur generi in ordine & gradu deſcenſionis*. As man and beaſt are comprehended under *animal*, as inferiour to *animal* contained under that head: *animal* is before *homo*, and above him in order of nature; thoſe *ſpecies*, viz. *Homo* and *Brutum* are caſt under *animal*, as a more general head of Beings. 2. The *ſpecies* is ſubject to the *genus* in predication; make an axiome of *genus* and *ſpecies*, and we ſhall ſee the *ſpecies* to be the ſubject more often then the *genus*; as *homo eſt animal*, Socrates *eſt homo*.

Chapter II.

Concerning the diſtribution of Genus *and* Species.

Genus eſt generaliſſimum aut Subalternum] The *Genus* is moſt general, or ſubalterne.

The *Species* is ſubalterne, or moſt ſpecial,

The *Genus* is diſtributed into two kinds; moſt general, and ſubordinate: the *ſpecies* is alſo divided into two kinds; intermediate, or moſt ſpecial. God hath ranked things in order, that there is a ſubordination of things one to another, and one under another. There muſt be extreams on either ſide, ſomthing higheſt, ſomthing loweſt; a moſt general, and a moſt ſpecial; and ſome between both. The ſubalterne *Genus* and *Species*, as they ſtand in reſpect to their ſuperiours, they are *Species*; as they reſpect their inferiours, they are kinds, or generalls: that is, they receive their eſſence from their ſuperiours, and communicate it to their inferiours. As man receiveth his eſſence from *Animal*, a living creature, and therefore is ſaid to be his *Species*: and again he communicates his eſſence with ſingular men; whence he is called their *Genus*.

The higheſt *Genus* is moſt general; the loweſt *Species* is moſt ſpecial; the intermediate kinds, which come between theſe, are the *Genus* of their inferiours and the *Species* of their ſuperiours; which by reaſon of this viciſſitude and changing, by courſes and turns, are called ſubalterne,

Genus generaliſſimum eſt cujus nullum eſt Genus.

The moſt general *Genus* is that of which there is no *Genus*.

Genus Generaliſſimum] the moſt general *Genus* (which in Greek is called γενικώτατον καὶ πρῶτον, the moſt general, and the firſt) It is that which hath none more general going before it, but is the Prime and firſt *Genus* of all.

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It is called the most General kind, because it is the supream and highest kind, which never descends, but always keepes the highest ranke, and can be nothing but *Genus*. *Subalternum Genus* is not onely and always *Genus*; but *Generalissimum* is only and always *Genus*.

Genus Generalissimum est] there is a most general *Genus*, *Est enim quoddam in suo genere in qualibet arte supremum*, there is somthing which is highest in every art; as argument in invention. Look also how many arts there are, so many supream kinds there are. If God hath ordered and disposed things by certain degrees one above another, there must be somthing supream and highest, which is the most general kind.

Cujus nullum est Genus] of which there is no *Genus*: this being the highest, hath no *Genus* above it, and therefore hath no *Genus* at all, and is never *Species*. It is *supremum in suo genere non datur processus in infinitum*, there cannot be an infinite motion and procession in Creatures; *Ergo standum est in aliquo primo*: we must rest in some first, and highest thing. Art in general is the *Genus* of all the special Arts; and *Ens* the most general *Genus* of all beings.

The subaltern *genus*, as also the subaltern *species*, is that which is the *species* of one, but the *genus* of another. All things comming between the supream *genus*, & *species infima*, are subalternal kinds and *species*. This is the forme of subaltern *genus* and *species*; to be *genus* in respect of inferiours, and *species* in respect of superiour, and higher things: the same thing cannot be a *species* in respect of superiour and inferior, no more then *Alexander* can be son and Father to the same *Philip*; *Subalternum genus & species* may be the same, differing only in a respect; and therefore one definition may serve both: *genus potest esse species, quia potest esse pars Generis*; It may be a part of a *genus* which is above it; and *species* may be *genus*, because it may be *totum partibus essentiale* to his inferiours which are under it. Cause is a *species* to *argumentum absolute consentaneum*, but a *genus* to matter and forme.

Species specialissima est, quæ est Individua in alias species.]

The most special *species* is that which cannot be divided into other *Species*.

Species specialissima] the most special, the lowest *species*.

Est] is; *Est enim quoddam infimum in naturâ*; there is somthing lowest: as there is a highest, above which we cannot ascend; so there is a lowest, beneath which we cannot descend. We must proceed from the highest by the intermediate, to the lowest, and there rest.

Qui est Individua in alias species] which cannot be divided into other *species*] We may divide it into members, but we cannot divide it into any lower *species*: there cannot be lower then the lowest. As *genus generalissimum*

mum hath no *genus* above it; so *species specialissima* hath no *species* under it; it is perpetually a *species*, and never a *genus*: It always takes his essence from his superiours, but never communicates it with inferiours; because it hath nothing beneath it, into which it may be distributed. Singular men take their essence from *homo* as their *genus*; but never communicate it to inferiours; for there is nothing inferiour to those singulars. Thus this singular matter, and this singular form are most special *species*: and *Socrates*, *Plato*, and all individual men, are most special *species*; which is individual into other *species*. This is that which is commonly called *individuum*, an individual.

That every Individual is a *species*, I shall labour to demonstrate when we come to the consectaries. To make way for this especially, I have touched briefly upon the distribution of *genus* and *species* in this Chapter.

Chapter III.

Wherein is propounded certain Corollaries, or consectaries, deduced and flowing from the explication of Genus *and* Species.

First from the explication of *genus*, there is a double consectary. That *genus* doth partly agree with *Integrum*, and partly dissent from it. It agrees with it, because it is *totum*; It dissents from it, because it is *Totum partibus essentiale.*

First we shall therefore speak to their agreement in several conclusions.

The first conclusion concerning the agreement of *totum universale*, and *totum integrale*,

Totum universale, & totum integrale, the universal, and integral whole, are both immutable in *Actu signato* (if I may so speak) and mutable in *Actu exercito*: They are both signed with an immutable and unchangeable rule and definition; but are changeable in the particulars. The englisn is, the rules concerning these are eternal and immutable; but the special examples are mutable, fluxile and variable. Here Mr *Hudson* is mistaken, for he makes immutability an affection of *genus*; and mutability a property of *integrum*. His words (*p.* 81.) are, *that* totum *which is mutable and fluxile, is an* integrum; *for a* genus *is immutable, constant, permanent*, æternæ veritatis.

Answer, It is true that *genus* is immutable in *Actu signato*; and it is as true, that *integrum* is immutable, constant, permanent, *æternæ veritatis*. For every rule of art is eternally true, and without possibility of being false; being all the rules of the eternal wisdom of the first being. *Genus est totum partibus essentiale*, is an eternal immutable rule: *Integrum est totum cui partes sunt essentiales*, is likewise an eternal and standing rule, incapable of mutation. The rules concerning mutable things are immutable. I cannot con-

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cur with M. *Hudſon* (*p*. 79.) in his definition of *totum integrale*. His words are theſe. *Quod habet partes extra partes eſt totum integrale, Sed eccleſia viſibilis univerſalis habet partes extra partes, ergo.* The major is the very definition of *totum integrale*. *Anſw.* How can that be the very definition of *totum integrale*, when *genus habet partes extra partes? Socrates, Plato, Paul*, &c. are *ſpecies*, and therefore *partes hominis*, and yet are not one within another, but different one from another.

But take any example of *genus* or *integrum*, and both are mutable; For all kinds of things in this inferiour world are mutable Theſe kinds of things that live a ſpringing life are corruptible; and ſo are thoſe kindes of beings which live the life of ſenſe. The whole kind of trees, and the whole kind of brute beaſts ſhall utterly periſh at the laſt. In this reſpect *totum genus plantarum & brutorum*, are mutable and fluxile. Man is now of a ſhorter life then he was before the flood; I ſpeak of man as *genus hominum*, of man in general. Hence that rule which Mr *Hudſon* propounds is not true, *viz.* That *totum* which is mutable and fluxile, is an integral. For Tree-kind and Brute-kind are mutable and fluxile, and yet neither of them is an integral, but each of them is a *genus*.

Conclusion II.

Totum genericum & integrale are both of them *argumenta orta*: arguments ariſing and ſpringing from the firſt as their root; being derived from thence, as ſtreams from their Fountain, and children from their Parents,; reſembling and repreſenting their nature. They are as the image and ſhadow of the firſt, ſymbolically, tacitely, and ſecretly comprehending the prints and footſteps of thoſe firſt arguments, wearing their badge and livery. Theſe having the force of the firſt communicated to them, argue as they in reſpect of their force and affection of arguing, but in a new way and manner, as ſecond notions at the ſecond hand: look what force the cauſe hath to argue its effect, the ſame force hath an argument ariſing from the cauſe to argue the ſymbol of the effect. As the matter and forme argue their effect, ſo the members argue the *integrum*.

Hence it apears, that *genus* is not *cauſa materialis*. as Mr *Hudſon pag*. 78. judgeth; for this he ſpeaks of it; as it doth exiſt in the individual, it is *cauſa materialis individui*.

Anſw. *Genus* is not *cauſa materialis*, or *materia*; for that is a firſt argument deriving this force of arguing from no other. It is *ſymbolum materiæ*; not as it relates to *genus* (as Mr *Hudſon* there ſpeaks) but as *genus*: for *genus* relates not *genus*.

2. Hence it alſo appears, that Mr *Hudſon pag*. 78. is miſtaken in conceiving that the *genus* only is a ſecond notion, and that thereby it is diſtinguiſhed from

from the integral. The *genus* being a second notion: and also in the same page, *But Universality is of another nature, being an abstract second notion,*

Answ. It is true, *genus* is a second notion; but it is not thereby distinguished from *integrum*; for that is a second notion, arising from some first argument.

Conclusion III.

Genus and *integrum* are both capable of admission and ejection of parts. That is not a true rule which Mr *Hudson pag.* 81. propounds. *That totum whereunto there is admission, wherein there is nutrition and edification, and out of which there is ejection,* that is an integral: his meaning is, it is not *genus.*

Answ. That *totum* may be a *genus*; for *animal* admitted beast and man at the first under his wing: when a man is born and admitted into the world, he is admitted into mankind: when an individual lyon comes into the world, he is admitted into lyon-kind: when *Bucephalus* was foaled, he was admitted *genus equorum*, and was nourished, &c. and when he dyed, he was ejected and cast out of that kind: when an individual lyon dyes, he is excommunicated from lyon-kind. All beasts at the last shall be excommunicated, and cast out of the society of *animal*, a living creature. When a Scholler is admitted into a Colledge and University, he is admitted into a new kind of society, where he is nourished and edified in good literature: when he is expelled from thence, he is cast out of that kind of society. The reason is, because there is no individual integral corporation or society, but is of some kind or other.

Conclusion IIII.

There is a reciprocation between the whole and the parts. Although the parts are not the whole, yet they are adæquate and equal to the whole. This rule belongs to distribution and definition; *In quâ utraq; affectio reciprocationis est, illic partium omnium cum toto, hîc definitionis cum definito.* The whole contains just as much as the parts, and the definition as the definite: *& contrà partes simul sumptæ,* are equal to the whole, neither more nor less; they will reach as far as the whole, and no farther; and the whole will extend it self as far as all the parts, and no farther. They are like vessels holding the same measure, of equal latitude and extent, one as large as the other; as two pints, and a quart. Having the whole, you have all the parts; and having the parts you have the whole. *Omnis divisio debet exhaurire totum divisum.* But one part alone is narrower, and reacheth not so far as the whole: this reciprocation is *partium omnium cum toto*; not of any one. For if one part alone were equal to the whole, all the parts together were greater then the whole. But that is a clear standing everlasting rule, that the whole is

greater then the part; that is, then any one part. And this being a property of *totum*, as such, is true of *totam universale*, and *integrale*.

1. Of *Totum universale*. The *genus* is greater then any any one *species*; *homo* is greater or larger then *Socrates*; and *Animal* larger then *homo*. The *totum genus*, the whole *genus* is not in every part or *species*; the generality or universality of the *genus*, is not in every *species*; humanity universally considered in the whole latitude and extent of it, is not in *Socrates*. The reason is, because *genus* is *totum* a whole; and *species est pars generis*: the *species* is but a part of the *genus*. *Genus* gives it self to be divided among all his *species*, but gives not it self wholy and altogether to any one *species*. It is a whole containing many or several parts, and is not wholy or universally in one part or *species*. There is but a part of the *genus* in one *species*; and therefore when we say *Socrates est homo*, *Socrates* is a man; we mean not that he alone is a man: for then *Socrates* should be *genus*, giving and communicating essence to his *species*, which cannot be: *tota humanitas & universa*, all humanity universally considered, is not in *Socrates*: for part of humanity is in *Plato*, *&c.* it is proper *to genus* to be *totum universale*, this cannot belong to any part: the *genus* is of larger and wider extent then any one *species*; *Animal* extends it self beyond *Brutum*, and comprehends *Homo* also within its compass.

Quest. *When* Brutum *was made, and not* Homo; *where was* Animal? *When brute beasts were made, and not man; where was living creature.*

Answ. Animal, living creature, that *genus* or kind was still in making, and not perfect till *Homo* was made,

2. It is as true of *totum integrale*; All the members are equal to the whole, but not any one. Hence an *integrum*, an entire thing, cannot have his whole integral entire nature preserved in one part or member.

Mr *Hudson* affirmeth, that *the Catholike integral Church*, *i. e.* the Church Catholike, which he affirmes to be an integral, *may be brought into a narrow room, and haply to one congregation*; *it is possible*: (saith he in *p.* 88.) *yet all the essence and priviledges of the Church Catholick Visible, are contracted and reserved therein.* This position is as cross to reason, as that one is two or three; *integrum* cannot be made of one member; for all the members give essence, and being to the integral. A part, cannot be the whole; the eye cannot be the whole body; 1 *Cor.* 12. 17. *If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole body were hearing, where were the smelling?* v. 18. *But now, God hath disposed the members every one of them in the body, at his own pleasure.* v. 19. *For if they were all one members, where were the body?* v. 20. *But now are there many members, but one body.* A mutilated, and maimed body, cannot be a perfect and entire body.

M. *Hudson*

M. *Hudſon* will not affirm that a City may be preſerved entire in one member; for a City contains many Citizens: there cannot be πόλις, of πολὺς; *multus*, where there is but one man. M. *Hudſon* conſents to this, that the nature of a flock is not reſerved in one ſheep; or a Corporation in one man; or that a ſwarm of Bees cannot be in one Bee. *Integrum* is not made of one member, as M. *Hooker* chap. 15. pag. 26. ſpeaks. I wonder to what end M. *Hudſon* ſpeaks of a flock and a ſheep; which are *Integrum* and *membra*; when he would ſhew that the whole nature of the *genus* is not in *una ſpecie*.

Conclusion V.

Genus and *Integrum* are both exiſting, and meaſurable by time and place. I find M. *Hudſon* clearly and fully expreſſing his judgement, that *Genus* doth not exiſt, and that it is not meaſurable by time and place: I ſhall preſent ſome of his expreſſions concerning this buſineſs, to the Reader; *viz.* in *page* 78. he ſaith, *Univerſality is of another Nature, being an abſtract ſecond Notion.* And again in the ſame page he hath theſe words; *Genus being a ſecond Notion, exiſteth not; but* in intellectu noſtro: habet fundamentum in rebus, non exiſtentiam; *for as it doth exiſt, it is an integral, and loſeth his abſtract nature, wherein the Univerſality doth conſiſt.* And again in page 88. *Genus is a notion not exiſting.* I ſhall name but one place more, in page 81. where he expreſſeth himſelf in theſe words; *That* Totum *which is meaſured by time and place, is an* Integral; *for* Genus *which is a notion, is capable of neither of them.* By which, *&c.* it appears, that M. *Hudſon* apprehends that this is one main difference between *genus* and *integrum*: that *genus* is a notion not exiſting, nor meaſurable by time and place; but *integrum* exiſts, and is meaſured by time and place.

Anſw. I conceive and affirm, that both of them (*genus* as well as *integrum*) are exiſting things, meaſured by time and place; and that both of them ſhew their faces in *rerum Naturâ*; and that the Underſtanding finds neither of them lurking or lying hid in the bottomleſs pit of non exiſtence. The exiſtence of *integrum* is ſo palpable and plain, that M. *Hudſon* hath no ſcruple about it, ſuſpects it not in the leaſt meaſure, but gives in his clear Teſtimony concerning the exiſtence of it; that he hath ſeen it ſtanding out from all his cauſes, and that time and place have taken meaſure of it, or at leaſt are able to do it; he affirms that it is meaſurable by both. Only I conceive that he offers ſome wrong and indignity to *genus*, to deny it the ſame priviledge. We ſhall therefore plead, (ſo far as the laws of Logick, and ancient ſtatutes of reaſon will give in evidence for us) and labour to demonſtrate, that exiſtence is a priviledge duly belonging to *genus*; and that he cannot be denyed it in the Court of Argumentation, without the violation of the rules of reaſon.

In the touching or handling this cause, we shall speak some things, First, By way of Explication; *Secondly,* By way of Confirmation of the Truth. *The Question being stated, we shall give the Explication in several Propositions.*

Proposition I.

Second Notions are as real as first Notions: *Argumenta orta* are as real as *prima:* arising Arguments are as real, true existing things, as the very first Arguments from whence they arise; and have as real a Being and Entity as they. *Adam* was the first man, but all his sons are true men as well as himself: So those Arguments which arise and spring from the first, as their Ancestors or Predecessors, are real Things or Beings, as well as their Parents, from which they descend. Those which some call Nominal (because the force of Arguing is in the name) yet have a reality in them, and are not meer fictions; but here the force of Arguing lieth in the things themselves. Definition is not a first Argument, but is beholding to the first Arguments for his Birth, Nativity, and Breeding; and hath derived his whole Existence and Being from them; and yet is not a meer Notion, crept into the Understanding of man, before it was duely entred and enrolled into the Artificial Fabrick of Reason; which is one of those *Vestigia* and Impressions which the first Being hath left behind him. Those who read in the great book of the world, and turn over those leaves and volumes, may find the explication of the quiddity, and being of things, or the bounds of their being unfolded; which is nothing else, but their definition. E.Gr. *homo est animal rationale,* a man is a reasonable creature: this is the definition of man. Men and angels could never make this to be the definition of man, but find it made before their eyes; they gather it up with the hands of their understandings; which they could never have gathered, if there had been no such fruit growing in the garden of nature, or in *artificio rei.* *Totum integrale* is listed in the number of arising arguments, being a symbol of the effect: and yet is never so much as charged or accused by M. *Hudson,* or any other (that I have heard) for non-reality or non-existence. We have gained thus much already in pleading the cause of *genus,* that his ortive or derivative nature is no prejudice at all to his real being, and existence. We cannot deny, but that the impressions of other second notions, have been extant many thousands of years; and what reason have we (if we desire to deal impartially) to say, that *genus* is not extant, because it is a second notion? For my part, I cannot deny but that it is come abroad in the world, as the impression of the first being, who is author, *entium & artium,* unless I had some spleen against this more then against other second notions; to which this (if it may have its right) is not inferiour.

Proposition II.

PROPOSITION II.

Abſtractio vel Ἀφαίρεσις *eſt ſejunctio* Περιλομένου. The abſtraction of the Περιλόμενον, is that whereby the underſtanding can ſeperate, and ſever the arts one from another, that are confounded in the Περιλόμενον; which is *opus motu artis factum.* As a Geometrician can take magnitude (length, breadth and thickneſs) from a body in conceit; that is, he can underſtand thoſe dimenſions which are found only in material things, not conſidering or looking at the matter. This abſtraction is common to all Arts, there is the impreſſion of all Arts in the things; and one may abſtract the workmanſhip of one Art from the workmanſhip of another Art. As ſuppoſe ſeven Artificers have bin at work in building a Ship; the Carpenter, Smith, Glaſier, &c. a man by his underſtanding may ſever the work of the Glaſier, or the work of the Smith, from the work of the Carpenter, &c. The firſt being (having all arts in himſelf) hath left an impreſſion of them in the frame and building of the world; and here a man by his underſtanding may ſever the fabrick of one Art from another. When a man looks upon a Tree, by the eye of Logick, he may abſtract, and draw away the *artificium logicum* from it; he looks upon it as bringing forth fruit; and in that reſpect he ſees a cauſe and effect there; as it is of ſuch a colour or quantity, he ſees a ſubject there; as it is placed in ſuch an Orchard, he ſees it as an adjunct; as it containes root, body, and branches, he finds *integrum* and *membra* there; as it is a Vine, Fig-tree &c. He finds *genus* and *ſpecies* there, &c. The Phyloſopher looks at the *artificum phyſicum:* the Grammarian looks at the word, &c. The Arithmetician at the number, &c. This abſtraction is nothing but ſevering the work and artifice of one art from that of another, in my underſtanding; not conſidering the other frames that are there growing together with it.

As there is an abſtraction of the work of one Art from the work of another; ſo there is alſo an abſtraction of ſome part or piece of the work of one Art, from other parts and pieces of the work of the ſame Art growing together with it in the ſame frame. One may abſtract the workmanſhip of a Carpenter appearing in the frame of the windowes made by him, and look upon that piece of his art, without conſideration of the reſt of the building, or any other part of it. So here I can abſtract the conſenting arguments from the reſt in my conſideration, or I can leave them, and conſider the ariſing arguguments; as the *genus*, definition, &c. And this abſtraction is not a real ſeparation of thoſe arguments and affections from the things, but only a mental ſeparation, whereby a man ſees a thing diſtinct from another, and looks upon it alone diſtinctly. I can conſider the nature of a thing in the abſtract, that never ſubſiſts by it ſelf but in the concrete. As I can take colour from a body coloured (although no colour can ſubſiſt alone by it ſelf) and conſider

that quality alone by it self in its own nature, without consideration of the subject, in which this quality is inherent. So likewise we may abstract moysture from the ayre, and consider it only in its own nature, as a quality whereby a thing is ready to flow out of its own bounds, and to take the figure of another thing. Lastly, thus we may abstract humanity from *Socrates*, *Plato*, &c. and conceive the *idea* of it in our minds, without the consideration of *Socrates*, *Plato*, &c.

PROPOSITION III.

The abstraction of a logical notion from the thing, is no prejudice to its existence: when a man by the rule of Geometry abstracts magnitude from a body, in his mind; it followes not from hence, that there is no magnitude existing in bodies; I can abstract moysture from the ayr, and consider it abstractively and sejunctively in its own nature; and yet there is moysture really existing in nature.

PROPOSITION IIII.

The abstraction of *genus*, or the general universal nature of things, from the things themselves, by mental consideration; is no argument to demonstrate the non-existence of *genus* and universals in *rerum naturâ*. The abstraction of heat from fire, or dryness from the earth, or a colour from a boby coloured, *i. e.* the consideration of any of these in their own distinct nature, is no evidence that these things are not really existing in nature; so likewise, the abstraction of *genus* and universality, is no evidence against their real existence and being in nature; but a good argument (as we shall perceive presently) of their real entity, and that they are extant in *rerum naturâ*. Is there no colour really existing, because I can abstract it? the universality of things doth not consist in their abstract nature (as M. *Hudson p.* 78. conceives) as the quantity and quality of things consist not in their abstract natures; that is, they are not so, because I discerne them; but they are existing, and therefore I discerne them. I know not the reason why Mr *Hudson* should call the nature of things, their abstract nature: for the nature of things is the same, when they are not abstracted and discerned, and when they are taken into consideration by our understanding. Colours are the same seen or unseen: our apprehension cannot change the nature and property of things. I cannot assent to that notion of Mr *Hudson p.* 78. that as the *genus* exists, it loseth his abstract nature; for by that reason, nothing existing could be abstracted. I can consider the nature and definition of *integrum*, without the consideration of this or that integral; and yet Mr *Hudson* confesseth, that *integrum* is always existing.

PROPOSITION V.

The subsistence of universals in singulars, is no argument of their non-existence,

ſtence. Univerſals are ſubſiſtent in ſingulars; and *genus* ſubſiſts in individuals as *animal* in *homine & bruto*; and *homo* in *Socrates, Alexander, Cicero, &c.* And we muſt look for *genus* in *individuis*, and there we ſhall find it; It is where individuals are. But this doth not argue and demonſtrate, that it hath no real exiſtence. Quantity and quality have no ſubſiſtence, but in their proper ſubjects; and yet there are ſuch things really extant in the world. Colour, ſavour, and odour, have no ſubſiſtence, but in mixt bodies; and yet are real things. There is ſuch a thing as paternity exiſting in the world; and yet cannot ſubſiſt without Filiation; *integrum* is a real thing, and yet never ſubſiſts without his members. And as *integrum* hath his ſubſiſtence in his members, ſo *genus* in his individuals. As *integrum* is, where the members are; ſo *genus* is, where the indviduals are. A flock is, where the ſheep are, which are the members of that body. There cannot be the whole body without the head, hands, feet, or members of which it is made. So it is with *genus* and *ſpecies*: there cannot be *homo* without individuals, as *Socrates, Plato, &c.*

This ſeemeth rather to be an Argument, and demonſtration of the real exiſtence of univerſals: for how could they be in ſingulars, if they were not really exiſting? If quantity and quality are in their proper ſubjects; it is certain that there are ſuch things in the world. So likewiſe, if univerſals are ſubſiſting in ſingulars; it is moſt certain that there are ſuch things in *rerum naturâ*.

PROPOSITION VI.

Genus is capable of time, and place, and may be meaſured by both. This Mr *Hudſon p.* 81. denyeth, but we affirme.

1. It is capable of time, and may be meaſured by it. The eſſence of a thing ſtands in the union of matter and form; the duration or continuance of the act of the forme upon the matter, or the holding together of the matter and form, is an adjunct of the eſſence: and this is time.

Continue, of *con & teneo*, to hold together.

2. There is a duration of the matter and forme of individuals. The matter and forme of *Gabriel* have continued together above 5000. years.

3. *Gabriel*, and other individual Angels, have been exiſting in the world above 5000. years: his duration and theirs is meaſured by time.

4. Hence the *totum genus*, Angel-kind, the whole kind of angels were created in beginning of time, and have been in the world a certaine ſpace of time; the duration of the whole kind is equal with the duration of the individuals, and is therefore meaſured by time. There was a time when there was no kind of inconſtant natures in the world, *viz.* the firſt 12. hours, when there was nothing but the third heaven, and the angels created; and the firſt matter, after that all the ſeveral ſorts and kinds of things, which were perfected

fected by degrees, came into the world in their order, ſucceſſively one after another, all the kinds have continued in the world for many 1000 years. The exiſtence of all theſe kinds is meaſured by time.

All theſe kinds alſo are meaſured by place; for where the individuals are, there are the kinds. All the individuals of every kind are in ſome place or other; and therefore it may be truly affirmed, that all kinds of things were ſeated in ſome place or other. The ſtars, the whole kind of them remain in the element of fire to this day. I conclude this propoſition; The *genus* ſubſiſting in individuals, which are in time and place, in that reſpect is it ſelf alſo in time and place.

Having premiſed theſe things, we ſhall now ſtate the queſtion, and give ſome arguments for the confirmation of the truth.

That which is to be demonſtrated, is, that *genus* is not a notion (as Mr *Hudſon p.* 81. calls it) that is, a meer notion: we ſhall labour to prove that *genus* is not a meer notion floting only in the brain; it is not a meere fantaſme or fantaſtical thing, exiſting only in *intellectu noſtro*, and no where elſe: but a real thing. *Univerſalia non ſunt intentionalia, ſed realia*; Univerſal things are real things, exiſting in nature, and *rebus ipſis*. That *genus* is exiſting in *rerum naturâ*, may appear by theſe reaſons.

1. *Reaſon*, Every artificial argument is in *rerum naturâ*, exiſting really in nature:

Genus is an artificial argument;

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturâ*.

The *Major* or firſt propoſition is evident, for that is an artificial argument, which is in *artificio rei*: in the frame, fabrick, and nature of the thing immediately.

The *Minor* is alſo clear, that *genus* is an artificial argument: for it is either an artificial argument, or a teſtimony; but it is not a teſtimony: *ergo*. It argues not by an aſſumed force as a teſtimony, but in, and of it ſelf. The *genus* is arguing and claiming an intereſt in his *ſpecies*, as parts of himſelf, before any man give teſtimony of it.

2. *Reaſon*, That which may be invented and found in *rerum naturâ*, is in *rerum naturâ*

Genus may be invented and found in *rerum naturâ*.

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturâ*.

Invenire eſt in rem venire, to invent is to come in upon a thing: and it is impoſſible to finde a thing in nature, that is not there to be found. A man cannot find fruits or flowers growing in orchards or gardens where they never grew: nor mines of gold, in places where the Sun never made any. If *genus* were not in *fabrica rei*, in the frame of things; it could never be found

found there. *Genus* may be invented, for it is an argument in the first part of Logick, which is nivention.

Reaſ. 3. That which may be abſtracted from the things, is in *rerum naturâ.*

Genus may be abſtracted form the things.

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturâ.*

That *genus* may be abſtracted, is granted by Mr *Hudſon:* and abſtracted and drawn away it could not be, if it were never exiſting in the things. Men cannot gather grapes of thorns, or figges of thiſtles, where they never grew. If *genus* were not growing and ſpringing up in the garden of nature, it could never be abſtracted and drawn from thence by the conſideration of our underſtandings. To abſtract (as we have heard) is to ſee a thing diſtinct from another, that grows together with it in the frame. If magnitude were not really exiſting in a body, and adjoyned to it, it could never be abſtracted from it by Geometry.

Reaſon, 4. Every *totum* whoſe parts are real things, really exiſting in nature, is it ſelf in *rerum naturâ.*

Genus is a *totum,* whoſe parts are real things, really exiſting in nature;

Therefore *genus* it ſelf is in *rerum naturâ.*

The firſt propoſition is fair and rational; for there is a reciprocation of all the parts with the whole. The whole containes juſt as much as the pars; and it cannot contain ſo much as the parts, if the parts be full of entity and reality; and the whole be a vain thing, having no reality, or real entity, and being in it. If *genus* be a meer fantaſtical thing, and notion, which men have got in their crowns, it is an empty veſſel, and holds no real entity at all; and then the parts muſt be empty. A veſſel full of ayre or wind is empty, in compariſon of that which is filled with water or precious liquor. If the *ſpecies* are real things, and the *genus* an empty notion, an empty veſſel, how can it hold as much as the *ſpecies*? If that be an empty thing, it pours out nothing but emptineſs into the *ſpecies*; and they receive nothing but emptineſs from it. *Animal* is as real a thing as *homo* and *brutum*: And *Homo* as real, as *Socrates,* or *Plato.*

The *minor* is moſt true, that *ſpecies,* eſpecially the individual *ſpecies,* are real things: Mr *Hudſon* will not deny, that *Peter, Abraham,* and *David,* &c. are real things.

Reaſon, 5. That which gives and communicates real eſſence and being to other things, is in *rerum naturâ.*

Genus gives and communicates real eſſence, and being to other things;

Therefore *genus* it ſelf is in *rerum naturâ.*

That which is a meer fantaſie or fantaſtical thing, can give no eſſence.

How can that which is onely in the brain give essence? If it were onely mental, it could not give being; *Nihil dat, quod non habet.* It is a strange thing to conceive that a notion should sit in a mans understanding, and brood so many real things: all the *species* of things should then have a mighty dependance upon mens understanding: For upon this account, if there were no reasonable Creatures, having understanding to catch and hold this bird; it would imediately make use of its wings, and flee as an Eagle out of the world, and the compass of beings, and vanish into just nothing. All universalls would betake themselves to their flight, they would all take their leave. But if there should be but one rational creature produced in the world, they would come flocking in thick and threefold, and build their nests in his understanding; and being well seated there, would out of their emptines pour out themselves as freely upon their *species*, and make them as real beings as ever they were.

Genus gives and communicates being to other things, *i. e.* to his *species*: for *genus est totum partibus essentiale.* The essential causes, which constitute the essence, are comprehended in the *genus*, and the forme. *Homo est animal rationale*: *Animal*, a living creature is essential to man: It containes part of the essence of man. For the definition layeth out all the essentiall causes.

Reason, 6. If there be a community of nature and kindred between beings, and general kinds of things in *rerum naturâ*, *genus* is in *rerum naturâ*,

But there is community of nature; and kindred between beings, and general kinds of things in *rerum naturâ*;

Therefore *genus* is in *rerum naturâ*.

I shut up diverse arguments in one, and conclude this question. I know no exception against either of the propositions. I see no ground to question the first: for what is in the *genus* but community of nature, and kindred between beings from the first? If therefore some special things have the same nature in common one with another; and if there be such neer affinity and kindred between beings; there is *genus in rerum naturâ.* If there be general kinds of things, *varia genera rerum*, there must be *genus*; for what is *genus*, but the general kinde?

The *minor*, or second proposition may easily appear. What is more evident then this, that there is community of nature, a kindred between beings, and general kinds of things in nature? Constant natures, as Angels, have the same Angelical nature in common one with another, divided between them. The Elements have one common nature, being a kin, *i. e.* of the same generall kinde one with another. So likewise have the Elementaries, which are made of them. All living things are of a kindred. Things that live the life of sense, are of a neere kindred: and those that live the life of reason, together with

with the life of ſenſe, have a neer agreement of nature, and are neer a kin one to another. *Jam.* 3. 7. δεδάμασται τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ : hath been tamed of the humane nature, or of mankind (as it is in our tranſlation) which are both one for the ſubſtance : all mankind having the ſame humane nature in common. So alſo there is a kindred of Arts (as *Cicero* ſpeaks : he affirms that) Poetry is a kin to Oratory ; becauſe all Arts have a common *Vinculum* and bond, and a certain kindred between them, by which they are contained, and held together, &c.

And that there are diverſe general and ſpecial kinds of things in nature appeares, *Gen.* 1. 11. 12, 21, 24. There are various kinds of trees, as a Vine, Fig-tree, &c. and ſeveral kinds of Apple-trees under that general kind. Several kinds of living creatures, Fiſhes, Birds, Beaſts ; and diverſe ſorts under one kind : under the general kind of beaſts, there are Lyons, Horſes, &c. who can reckon up their manifold kinds? There is Angel-kind, mankind, &c. All theſe kinds of things are real things : and all other kinds beſides mankind, were come into the world and had a real being and exiſtence before the underſtanding of man was created, and fitted to receive them. They could not exiſt then in *intellectu noſtro*: where could they exiſt, but in *rerum natura*?

We have heard of the agreement ; we are now to ſpeak concerning the difference of *totum univerſale*, and *integrale*.

Difference I.

The *genus* is a note of the cauſes; the *integrum* is a note of the effect: *genus* and *ſpecies* are notes of the cauſes and effects : and *integrum* and *membra*, are notes of the effect and cauſes. The *integrum* is a *Totum*, to which the parts are eſſential : they give eſſence, *i. e.* cauſes. The eſſential cauſes are the matter and form ; therefore theſe parts give matter and forme to the whole. Every member gives a portion of matter and forme ; and all members make up a common matter and forme of the whole : and of the matter and forme of every part, is made up the matter, and forme of the whole ; the matter of the whole is made of the matter of the parts ; and the forme of the forme of the parts.

And as theſe contain the matter and forme of the whole, ſo the *Genus* being eſſential to the parts, containeth the matter and common forme of the *ſpecies*. A perfect definition containes all the the eſſential cauſes of the thing, which are the matter and form, the general, and proper nature : the forme is expreſt, and the matter is included in the *genus*, which containes the matter and common forme.

Difference II.

The *Genus* commnnicates his whole eſſence, and his whole entire nature to the *ſpecies*. *Species habet naturam generis integram, non univerſam.* The

entire nature of the *genus* is in the *Species* : and in this respect, *tota natura generis conservatur in unâ specie*: All the entire nature of man was preserved in *Adam* ; because the *genus* is essentiall to its parts : it communicates his whole entire essence to every one of them. It is not so in *integrum* ; there the parts did give their essence to the whole, and not the whole to them. There therefore the rule is, *quicquid convenit membro, convenit integro* ; because the members were essential to it. But the rule here is, *quicquid convenit generi, convenit speciebus* ; because the *genus* is essential to them. And in this respect, *species recipit generis sui definitionem:* not in *actu signato*; the definition of the *genus* is not the definition of the *species*: we must not say *species est Genus* ; but in *actu exercito*, (as I said) that is, take any example of *genus*, as *Homo* is *Genus* to his individuals : and here the definition of *homo* is communicated to *Peter*. Man is a reasonable creature ; *Peter* is a man; therefore *Peter* is a reasonable creature. *Animal* is indued with sense, a lyon is *animal*; therefore a lyon is indued with sense.

Mr *Hudson p.*79. doth somwhat dissent from this : his expressions are these. *Though it be said that* tota natura generis conservatur in unâ specie, *and by this rule* in uno individuo, *it must be* fundamentaliter *only*, non formaliter, *for there is no such universality formally in* specie, & multo minis in individuo. *I answer,* That I know no man who affirms that the universality of the *genus* is in *specie* formally ; the universality is not there, but the entire nature of man is in *Socrate,* &c. the evidence which Mr *Hudson* brings for the demonstration of this, is, that the nature of an *integrum* cannot be preserved in one member : his words are, *as the nature of a flock is not reserved in one sheep, or a corporation in one man ; to use Mr* Hooker's *own words.*

Answ. He useth Mr *Hooker*'s own words indeed, for Mr *Hooker* disputes against Mr *Hudson,* and demonstrates clearly, that the nature of an *integrum* cannot be preserved in one member: but he professeth, that he yeilds that which all writers and rules confirme ; that *tota natura generis conservatur in una specie.* If Mr *Hudson* can prove that *genus* & *integrum* are the same, his instances will serve to some purpose ; otherwise they are propounded in vain; for a flock is an *integrum* ; and so is a corporation : an individual sheep cannot be a flock ; but an individual sheep hath the whole entire nature of a sheep in it : there is nothing in th enature of a sheep. that is wanting in this or that individual sheep.

Difference III.

The *Genus* communicates all his essential properties to his *species*, but the *integrum* doth not communicate his properties to his members. *Genus* is essential to his *species*, communicates his essence and nature, and therefore he

com-

communicates all his essential properties to his *species. Dans formam, dat formæ consequentia : quicquid tribuitur generi convenit speciei. Convenire* is to come together : all the essential properties of the *genus* do come together into the world with the *Species* : for nothing can be without his essential properties. If *homo* be *risibilis, Socrates est etiam risibilis.* If a plant hath seed within it self, a Vine also hath seed within it self; *Gen.*1.11. If art be practical, Logick is practical. And on the other side, those properties which agree not to the *genus*, agree not to the *Species.* If Art be not a habit, Logick is not a habit : the nature of a thing and the properties go both together. *Tollens naturas, tollit proprietates : tollens proprietates, tollit naturas.*

I wonder that M. *Hudson p.*80. should affirme, that a *genus* is not capable of adjuncts. *That which hath inherent accidents existing in it as its own, that is an integral : for a* genus *is not capable of them.*

Answ. Risibility is an adjunct of man existing in him as his own, it is his own propriety, he doth not borrow it from any other. It is a property of man firstly, and agrees to *Socrates* because he is a man. It is a Catholike property belonging to man as man. *Homo est animal risibile,* is a catholike axiom, which it, called καθόλου πρῶτον *primum de toto* because this is first true of the whole, and then of the parts; it is first true of *homo*, and then of *Socrates*, and *Plato, Omne animal risibile est homo : Omnis homo est animal risibile.* But it cannot be said truely, that *omne animal risibile est Plato.*

We have heard that the properties of the *genus* are communicated to the *species*; but the properties of the *integrum* are not communiaated to the members; for the members are essential to the integral. *Socrates est risibilis*, yet it cannot be said properly, *pes Socratis est risibilis, Socrates est capax disciplinæ*, but you cannot say that his heel is capable of discipline Mr *Hudson p.* 93. saith, *that this is true only of* integrum dissimilare, *not of* similare. *For a whole pint of water* (saith he) *doth moysten and cool; and so doth every drop.*

Answ. These properties agree to a drop, not as it is a part, or member of a pint, but because it is a *species* of water, having the forme of water in it to which all the properties do belong. One Bee makes honie, not because it is a member of this swarme, but because it is a *species* of Bee in general having all his essential properties.

DIFFERENCE IIII.

Genus communicates his operations to his *species*; but *integrum* doth not communicate his operations to all his members. All the essential operations of the *genus* are in every *species.* If the *genus* communicate his entire nature, and all his essential properties to his *species*, he communicates also all his essential operations; *operatio sequitur esse.* If it communicate his qualities,

and

and principles of acting it communicates his operations: for *frustrà fit potentia, quæ nunquam reducitur in actum.* It is true that *genus* exists and acts in his *species*; and *integrum* acts not without his members: If a star shines the north star shines.

Mr *Hudson* conceives that *genus* is inefficacious, *That* (saith M. *Hudson*) *which hath actions and operations of its own, is an integral; for a* Genus *is not capable thereof.*

Reason, 1. Every real being is capable of operations.

Genus is a real being.

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations.

The *major* is clear; because *operatio sequitur esse*, the operation of a thing followeth the being of it. *Omne ens agit*; because it is *propter finem*: that which is for an end, workes or can worke for that end: but every being is for an end: *ergo.*

The *minor*, that *genus* is a real being hath been prov'd before.

Reas. 2. A second reason that *genus* is capable of operations, is taken from his properties, and qualities; we have proved that *genus* is not empty of such things as those are.

That which hath proper qualities and principles, whereby it is able to work, is capable of operations.

Genus hath proper qualities, and principles, whereby he is able to worke.

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations.

We have made it evident, that *genus* hath properties, and proper qualities: And *frustrà fit potentia, quæ nunquam reducitur in actum.*

Reas. 3. A third reason is from the sad consequence which followes upon this position.

If no *genus*, no kind of things is capable of operations, all kind of things are made in vaine:

But all kind of things are not made in vaine:

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations.

For it is certain, that no kind of thing can attaine his end without operation; where there is no πρᾶξις, there can be no ἐυπραξία, or well working; which is the end of every kind of being.

Reas. 4. If there be operations proper to every kind, *genus* is capable of operations.

There are operations proper to every kind.

Therefore *genus* is capable of operations.

There are some operations proper to Angel-kind, some to mankind, some to other kinds. To bring forth fruit is proper to a Tree, not to be expected

from

from a ſtar, &c. To bring forth, and to bear grapes, is proper to a Vine, &c. *Men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thiſtles.* Matth. 7.16. There are ſome operations peculiar to lyons, ſome to Bees &c. I mean, that are proper to the whole kind.

Difference V.

The name of the *genus* may be given to the *ſpecies*; but the name of the integral cannot be given to the member: becauſe the *genus* is *totum eſſentiale*, communicating his whole nature, and all his eſſential properties and operations to his *ſpecies*: and the names of things are ſutable to their natures *Homo*, the name of a man, is given to *Socrates*, *Plato* &c. but the name o man is not given to his finger, or toe: for a member hath but part of the nature of the whole in it.

Obj. Pars ſimilaris *hath the name of the* integrum: *a drop of water is water.* M. *Hudſon* p. 89. 90, 91.

Anſw. A drop of water is *ſpecies*. *Aqua*, and *hæc aqua*, are *genus* and *ſpecies*, as Mr *Hooker* ſpeaks.

That *aqua* and *hæc aqua* are *genus* and *ſpecies*, may appear.

Reſ. 1. Where there is an eſſentiall predication of the whole of his part, there is *genus* and *ſpecies*;

But in *aqua*, and *hæc aqua*, there is an eſſential prædication; of the whole of his part.

Ergo.

The reaſon is, becauſe *genus* onely is *totum eſſentiale partibus.*

Reſ. 2. *Hæc aqua* hath ſome *genus.*

But this water hath no *genus* but water;

Therefore this water hath water for his *genus.*

Reſ. 3. If two drops of water are *ejuſdem generis*, then *aqua* is their *genus.*

But two drops of water are *ejuſdem generis.*

Ergo.

It is not abſurd that there ſhould be many thouſand *ſpecies* of water in one pailful, and many thouſand ſands in one handful, and many thouſand Bees in one hive.

Difference VI.

Genus eſt τῇ φύσει prius ſpecibus, & membra integro priora: the *genus* is before his *ſpecies* in priority of nature, and the member before the *integrum.* The reaſon is, becauſe *genus* is a note of the cauſes, *integrum* of the effect: the cauſes are in order of nature before the effect, and the effect after the cauſes. The *genus* is eſſentiall to his parts, giving cauſes to the *ſpecies*; the members are eſſential to the integral, communicating eſſence to it: the more univerſal, general,

general, or common any thing is, the more priority of nature it hath. *Animal eſt prius homine* (*eſt enim terminis communior quàm homo homo* before *Socrates*.

As *genus* is *prius* ſo it is *notius naturâ*. *Claritas generis non dependet à claritate ſpecici, ſed hinc ſeſe communicat*; ſingulars may be better known to us, but univerſals are by nature better known then ſpecials: *Homo* is better known then *Socrates*, or *Plato*; *Animal* better known then any of them; and ſubſtance better then that: *ens à primo* is better known then any of them all: becauſe it drawes neerer to *ens primum* which is *notiſſimum, & maximè intelligibile*. *Prius & notius naturâ eadem ſunt*. But the members are before the integral in order of nature, for that is made up of the members; and therefore cannot be before them. A houſe cannot be before the foundation and ſuperſtruction: A tree cannot be before the root, body, and branches. Mr *Hooker p.* 255. in his rational diſcourſe about the nature of *integrum*, made it appear as clear as the Sun, that the members which make up, and conſtitute the whole, are in order of nature before it. Yet Mr *Hudſon p.* 219. ſeemeth to plead for the priority of an integral; affirming, *that the nature of the Church Catholike, viſible in reſpect of the particulars, is like to the priority of a Kingdom, to the parts of it; or of a corporation, in reſpect of the parts of it. Which is not meant* (ſaith Mr *Hudſon*) *in a mathematical or techtonical conſideration: for ſo the particular buildings are* prima, *and the whole city* Orta. *Yet*, (ſaith he) *ſo M.* Hooker *underſtands me.*

Anſw. Mr *Hooker* ſpeaks not of a city only in reſpect of the artificial buildings: but he ſpeaketh of a civil body or corporation, and a politicial Kingdom: which bodies politick, and corporations hold correſpondence with a city, having many houſes and buildings in it; which houſes and buildings are in nature before the whole city; which is the effect ariſing from thoſe cauſes: So likewiſe the members of every body politick, are in nature before the entire body it ſelf, which is made up of thoſe cauſes. A city in a techtonical conſideration may be firſt in intention, perfection and dignity, as well as a civil, or eccleſiaſtical corporation.

Mr *Hudſon* ſpeaks, as if a city attended in a techtonical conſideration, could not be firſt intended. For Mr *Hudſon* oppoſeth theſe; *which is not meant* (ſaith Mr *Hudſon*) *in a techtonical conſideration, but in regard of intentions*, &c.

But it is a common rule, that which is firſt in intention, is laſt in execution, *& contrà*. The finiſhing and compleating the whole city is laſt in execution in a techtonical conſideration; why may it not be firſt in intention? but no integral body is firſt in eſſence. Mr *Hudſon p.* 219. affirms, *that the integral Church is firſt in eſſence*; which I confeſs is above the reach of my ſhallow

reaſon

reason; for the members give essence to the whole; that is, matter and form: and the *integrum* receives essence from them, being a symbol of the effect. And how is it possible to conceive that that should be first in essence, that is last in essence, receiving his essence from the essence of the parts?

Neither can any *integrum* be first *cognitione distinctâ & noscibilitate perfectâ*: it may be *notius nobis* analytically, but not *notius naturâ* genetically. When we analyse the frame and workmanship of god, we meet with the effects, and go from them to the causes, which we perceive by their effects: but the causes are better knowne by nature: because as *Res sese habent in esse, ita in cognosci*, the intelligibility and Cognoscibility of things, followeth their Entity and being.

Mr *Hudson p.* 278 speaks well and truly, *cognitio sequitur ordinem naturæ in se*. But how the Kingdom of England can be known without or before the knowledge of the distinct parts, I am not able to conceive. A man may indeed know the Policy, Laws, and Priviledges; and not know all the severall Towns: but the Towns are not the members of the Laws and Priviledges. A man cannot know the body of Laws distinctly, before he knows any of the particular Laws; For it is certain, that as the essence of a thing consists in his causes, so the knowledge of the essence of a thing consists in the knowledge of the Causes. The common place of causes, is the fountain of all Science; *Scirique demum creditur, cujus Causa teneatur: ut merito dicatur à Poëtâ. Fœlix qui potuit rerum cognoscere Causas.* It is a speculative happines, and the fœlicity of the understanding, to know the Causes of things. But there is but small happines to see the outside of the thing, not understanding the essentiall Causes, and ingredients into the essence, and being of it: A man may as well know the nature and essence of a thing distinctly, without the knowledge of his distinct nature and essence; as know a thing distinctly, without knowledge of his Causes.

We have heard of some consectaries, from the definition of *Genus*; I shall observe two things from the definition of *species specialissima* (which is that which cannot be divided into other *species*.) The first is that *individuum est species*. The second is, that though *species specialissima* cannot be divided into other *species*, yet it may be divided into members.

1. *Individuum est species*

Every singular, or individuall thing is a *species*.

Touching this question I shall first explicate, secondly confirm the Truth.

1. The explication may be given in these following *theses*, or positions.

THESIS. I.

The variation onely of situation or Accidents, is not sufficient to vary the *species*

1. Here I concurre with Mr *Hudson p.* 91. This man is an Englisſh man; This Engliſh man is a Suffolk man; This Suffolck man is an *Ipſwich* man. This prædication is *denominatio Adjuncta perſona à ſubjectis.* If a man remove his habitation from one Country to another, or from one Land to another, this make him not another *ſpecies.* As it is ſayd *Cœlum non animum mutant &c.* ſo I may ſay, *Cœlum non ſpeciem mutant, qui trans mare currunt.* The place is but a Subject, and not eſſentiall, and cannot make an eſſentiall difference between a man and himſelf.

2. Augmentation in ſtature, old Age, &c. make not a ſpecificall difference; *gradus non variant ſpeciem.*

3. Variation of ſex doth not vary the *ſpecies*; the ſame perſon may be *Mas, & fœmina.* An Hermaphrodite, or Androgyne, is not two perſons or *ſpecies*; and yet is both man and woman.

4. Various *ſpecies* muſt be various things, between which there is an eſſentiall difference.

Thesis. II.

Various *ſpecies* muſt fall under the eſſential predication of ſome kind, which is of a more general or comprehenſive nature: For *ſpecies eſt pars generis*; and the *Genus* is *totum partibus eſſentiale*: there muſt be therefore an eſſentiall prædication of ſomething more general, upon ſomething more ſpecial; as *Homo, eſt Animal: Hæc Aqua, eſt aqua.*

Thesis. III.

When we ſay *Socrates eſt Homo*, there is an eſſentiall prædication of *Homo*, which is more generall; upon *Socrates*, which is more ſpeciall. *Homo* is eſſentiall to *Socrates*, and comprehends *Socrates* and *Plato* under him: this Mr *Hudſon p.* 89. grants freely.

Thesis. IIII.

Socrates and *Plato* are *oppoſita*, oppoſite one to another: they are *diſparata*, that is, ſuch things whereof one is oppoſed to many; in like manner as a blew colour is oppoſed to red, green, &c. in like manner *Socrates* is oppoſed to *Plato, Cicero, Ariſtotle*, equally to one as well as to another. Hence *Socrates* and *Plato*, are not only diverſe, diſſenting in ſome logical reſpect; but oppoſite, diſſenting *re & ratione*, really and indeed, they diſſent in their own nature, as they are things; there is a bar in their nature; they are ſet one againſt another, that they can never be one and the ſame; as black cannot be white. *Socrates* and *Plato* are two, one cannot be the other, there is an eſſentiall difference between them.

Thesis. V.

Socrates and *Plato* are diſtinguiſht one from another by their proper and eſſentiall formes. As a man and a lyon differ in their common forme, ſo *Socra-*

tes

tes and *Plato* in their proper form. All oppoſition is firſtly from the form; hereby a thing is that which it is, and is therefore by this diſtinguiſhed from all other things. All eſſentiall diſtinction and oppoſition is from the forms of things; they differ not only accidentally, but eſſentially one from the other, and are diſtinguiſht one from another by their eſſentiall forms.

THESIS. VI.

The numericall difference between *Socrates* and *Plato*, is an Argument of their ſpecificall diſtinction: it includeth and implieth an eſſentiall difference between things, being diſtinguiſhed by their proper individuall eſſentiall forms. It is true, that our intellectualls are ſo wounded by the Apoſtacy of the firſt man, that it is exceeding hard for us to find out the forms of things: we are forced many times to deſcribe the forms of things by their accidents; as we are conſtrained to deſcribe the Elements by their proper qualities ariſing from their forms: yet every one of them hath a proper forme. The exiſtence of every thing is from all the cauſes: nothing can exiſt and be that which it is, without its proper form. And the difference of the proper form is no leſs then the difference of the common form, but rather greater. Look how much greater the ſimilitude and agreement is between Singulars in regard of their common forms, ſo much greater is the difference of their proper forme. The difference and oppoſition of contraries is the greateſt and ſtrongeſt; and yet they communicate in the ſame *genus*: theſe are more oppoſite one to another then things that are not under the ſame *genus*: white and black are more oppoſite, then white and bitter, &c. *Gravia bella fratrum.* To differ ſo numerically is to differ formally; to differ in number, is to differ in forme: for number is an affection or proper adjunct following the eſſence. *Socrates* and *Plato* have two diſtinct forms: hence they differ in eſſence; hence they have two diſtinct eſſences and beings; hence they are two: one cannot be the other, they cannot be both one and the ſame: hence they differ numerically one from the other. Where there is one humanity and eſſential forme of man, there is one eſſence of man, and one man: and where there are two humanities, and eſſentiall, proper, individuall forms of man, there are two men: hence they differ numerically, and one is not the other, or the ſame with the other. *Socrates* is not *Plato*, but is numerically different from him *Socrates* is one, and *Plato* is another: As *London* is one city, and *York* another. The difference of number is nothing but the difference of the proper and individuall forme, and to differ in number, is to differ in forme: two men have two different forms, two Lyons have two different formes. If *Socrates* and *Plato*, or any other individuall men differing in number, ſhould not differ in eſſence and forme, they ſhould differ only accidentally one from the other; as one man differs from himſelf, or as *Socrates* in his old age, differs from *Socrates*

in his youth; being the ſame man, and differing onely in accidents, not in eſſence. *Socrates* ſhould be *Plato*; and *Plato, Socrates.* And when *Alexander* rides *Bucephalus*, *Ariſtotle* ſits in the ſame ſaddle: and it were impoſſible not to ſet the ſaddle upon the right horſe; for every horſe is the ſame eſſentially; and he that ſtealeth one horſe, he ſtealeth all the horſes in the world; becauſe the eſſence of the one is the ſame with the eſſence of the other. There is a difference indeed in accidents, but none in eſſence; there being (according to this accompt) no eſſentiall or ſubſtantiall difference between them. Laſtly, Hence there is (upon the ſame accompt) no eſſential and ſubſtantial man in the world but only Ideal: for all generals ſubſiſt in individuals, and individuals onely ſubſiſt in themſelves. If therefore individualls differ not eſſentially one from another but only accidentally; there is no ſubſtantiall or eſſentiall man ſubſiſting by himſelf: becauſe individuall men only ſubſiſt in themſelves. If therefore no individuall, proper, eſſential, humane forme, there is no individuall eſſentiall man ſubſiſting; and therefore no individuall ſubſtantiall man in the world. Every individuall man is an accidentall man, having no proper, ſubſtantial, individual form or eſſence. He that hath no ſubſtantial proper form hath no ſubſtantial proper eſſence; and therefore cannot be a ſubſtantial individual man. And hence there is no ſubſtantial individual man in the world, but only ideal and common: and *Socrates* and *Plato* ſhould differ eſſentially no more one from another then Doctor *Martin*, and Doctor *Luther*. But the truth is, they have not one and the ſame eſſence, but differ in their eſſentiall forme one from another. For an accidentall forme cannot be the prime and principall eſſentiall Cauſe of a ſubſtance.

THESIS. VII.

The name agrees moſt properly to Individuals *Species* of the old verb *ſpecio* to ſee, or behold (as we have heard) ſignifieth the viſible face or appearance of a thing, a ſight or thing ſeen: the Greek word εἶδος of εἴδω, *video*, ſignifyeth a viſible ſhape, forme, image or repreſentation of a thing: (as we have heard) the reaſon is, becauſe individualls are onely viſible in themſelves, we may ſee ſome of their faces daily with our bodily eyes. Generalls cannot beſeen but in individualls; man cannot beſeen, but in *Socrates*, and *Plato*, and other individualls. It is clear therefore, that the name which is a note and repreſentation of the thing, ſutes beſt of all with ſingulars and individualls.

THESIS. VIII.

Logicians will grant, that *individuum eſt ſpecies.* Not onely *Ramus*, *Berhuſius Snellius*, *Gutberleth*, *&c.* but *Ariſtotle* will grant it: He teſtifyeth that the laſt and loweſt generall kindes are next above the individualls, as man is above individuall men. *Extrema, ſeu ultima genera ſupra individua ſunt, ut Homo.* I might eaſily name ſeverall Authors who con-

Ariſt. lib. 3. Metaph. c. 4.

conceive, that *Homo* is the *Genus* of Individuall men, and that individuall men are *species*. But those are onely inducements, not convincements, being onely inartificiall Arguments. We shall therefore (having propounded these preparatives and explications somwhat helping to understand the Cause in hand) present some Artificiall Arguments and reasons for the demonstration of this truth, that

Individuum est Species.

Singular Lyons are *species* of lyon in generall. *Socrates*, *Cicero*, *Aristotle*, *Solomon*, *Plato &c.* are species of *Homo*.

REASON. I.

If *Homo* be the *Genus* of *Socrates* and *Plato*, *Socrates* and *Plato* are *Species* of *Homo*.

But *Homo* is the *Genus* of *Socrates* and *Plato*;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species* of *Homo*.

Major: *Genus* and *species* stand in a mutuall respect, and look one to another, so that *Homo* cannot be *Genus*, *Socratis & Platonis*, unless *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species Hominis*: *Genus*, as such, hath an eye upon his *species*, and respects nothing else in the world: As the Cause argues nothing but his effect, so the *Genus* argues nothing but his *Species*.

Minor. The proof therefore of the *minor* is most of all here to be attended, *viz*. That *Homo* is the *Genus* of *Socrates* and *Plato*: which may appear thus,

Reas. 1. That to which the definition of *Genus* agreeth, is *Genus*:

But the definition of *Genus* agreeth to *Homo*, as he standsin respect to *Socrates* and *Plato*;

Therefore *Homo* is *Genus*, as he stands in respect to *Socrates* and *Plato*.

Genus is *totum partibus essentiale*; and *Homo* is *totum partibus essentiale*, giving essence to *Socrates*, *Plato*, and the rest of his individualls.

Reas. 2. If *Homo* stand in the same respect to his individualls, in which *Animal* stands to *Homo* and *Brutum*; *Homo* is the *Genus* of all individuall men:

But *Homo* stands in the same respect to his Individualls, in which *Animal* stands to *Homo* and *Brutum*;

Therefore *Homo* is the *Genus* of all individuall men.

Major prob. If *Homo* respects and argueth his individualls, as *Animal* respects and argues *Homo* and *Brutum*, *Homo* hath the affection and respect of a *Genus* to his individualls; For *Animal* hath the affection of a *Genus* to *Homo* and *Brutum*; and therefore, that being granted, there is as good reason that *Homo* should be *Genus* to individuall men.

Minor prob. *Homo* stands affected as much and in like manner to singular

men, as *Animal* to *Homo* and *Brutum*. Is *Animal* more general then *Homo*? *Homo* is more general then *Socrates*, &c. Doth *Animal* comprehend *Homo* & *Brutum*? *Homo* comprehends *Socrates*, & *Plato*, and all other individuall men under him. Is *Animal* essentiall to man and beasts? *Homo* is as essential to *Socrates* and his other individualls. Doth *Animal* communicate himself, and his whole essence to *Homo*? *Homo* is as liberall to *Socrates*, and *Cicero*, and his other individualls; keeps nothing to himself, but unlocks all his treasures of humanity, and bestowes all his whole estate, and all his humane excellencies, his entire nature, matter, and forme, his name, dignity, nobility, and all his titles of honour upon *Socrates*, & his other individualls, and challengeth as great an interest in them, as *Animal* can challenge in *Homo* and *Brutum*. If *Homo* can say, I am *Animal*; *Socrates* can stand upon the same termes with *Homo*, and say I am *Homo*. If *Homo* can say *Animal* is mine, and all that he hath: *Socrates* can say *Homo* is mine, and all that he hath.

Reas. 3. *Homo* is either *genus*, or *species*, in respect of individual men:
But *homo* is not *species*, in respect of individual men;
Therefore *homo* is *genus* in respect of individual men.

Major. *Homo* stands in some respect to individuals and singulars: Let any man put any other respect upon *homo*, as he respects his singulars, but either *genus* or *species*.

Minor. It cannot be a *species* (as some would have it) for it is called *species* onely in respect of his *genus*. If it be a *species* of singular men, of *Socrates*, *Plato*, &c. then those individuals must be his *genus*, and *Socrates* should be more general then *homo*. But it is clearer then the light of the sun, that *homo* is more general.

Reas. 4. If all individual men are *ejusdem generis*, of the same kind, all comprehended under mankind, *homo* is *genus*.
But all indiuidual men are *ejusdem generis*, of the same kind, all comprehended under mankind;
Therefore *homo* is their *genus*
What else can be their next *genus*?

REBSAN II.

If the definition of *species* agreeth to *Socrates* and *Plato*, *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*:
But the definition of *species* agreeth to *Socrates* and *Plato*;
Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *species*.

Minor prob. *Species est pars generis*, a part of the kind: *Socrates* and *Plato* are parts of mankind; they are of that stock and kindred, comprehended under that kind, and are parts of it. They can be no other but parts of mankind universally considered. If all the men in the world should be anni-

annihilated but *Socrates* and *Plato*, there were yet a part of mankind remaining in the world.

REASON III.

Thoſe parts which have the Entire nature, matter, forme and properties of the kind communicated to them, are *ſpecies*:

Socrates and *Plato* have the entire nature, matter, form and properties of the kind communicated to them;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *ſpecies*.

Major, It is proper to the *ſpecies* (as we have heard) to have the Entire nature and properties of the *genus* communicated to it. If a member had the Entire nature of the *Genus* communicated to it, a member were an *integrum*.

Minor, *Socrates eſt Animal rationale*, and hath the whole nature of *Homo*, and all his properties communicated to him: he is *Riſibilis*, and hath all humane properties which are eſſentiall to the whole kind.

REASON. IIII.

Thoſe things which have one and the ſame common nature, and are ſpecifically diſtinguiſht one from another, are *ſpecies*:

Socrates and *Plato* have one and the ſame common nature, and are diſtinguiſhed ſpecifically one from another.

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *ſpecies*.

The *Major* is evident *primo aſpectû*: The *minor* ſhall be cleared.

Thoſe which are diſtinguiſhed one from another by their proper eſſentiall forms, are ſpecifically diſtinguiſhed one from another:

Socrates and *Plato* are diſtinguiſhed one from another by their proper eſſentiall formes;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are ſpecifically diſtinguiſhed one from another.

We have made it clear in ſome of thoſe *Theſes* which we have propounded, that *Socrates* and *Plato* are diſtinguiſhed one from another, not accidentally, but by their proper eſſentiall formes: and that to differ numerically, is to differ by their proper forme.

REASON V.

Speciall beings comprehended and contained under that which is more generall, are *ſpecies*.

Socrates and *Plato* are ſpeciall beings comprehended under that which is more generall;

Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *ſpecies*.

What are *ſpecies*, but ſpeciall beings *i. e.*, ſuch beings as have a more ſpeciall nature and forme comprehended and contained under ſome more generall head?

Individuall

Individuall men are ſpeciall beings, &c *Socrates* and *Plato* are ſpeciall men, each having a ſpeciall forme (as we have heard) they are ſpeciall men, more contracted then *Homo in Genere*. Whatſoever is more contracted, is more ſpeciall: But the *Idea* of *Plato* or *Socrates* is more contracted then the *Idea* of *Homo* in generall; therefore they are more ſpeciall: *Socrates* is not a generall, but a ſpeciall man, having a ſpeciall nature, beſides his common nature. *Socrates* ſprings not from the ſame ſpeciall individuall principles out of which *Plato* is made.

REASON. VI.

Singular parts, bearing the name of the whole, are *ſpecies*:
Socrates and *Plato* are ſingular parts, bearing the name of their whole;
Therefore *Socrates* and *Plato* are *ſpecies*.

A member not having the Entire nature of the *Integrum*, is never called by the name of the *Integrum*, as we have heard. But the *ſpecies* having the whole eſſence, and definition of the *Genus* in it, is called by the name of the *Genus*.

A foot not having the Entire nature of *Homo* in it, is not called *Homo*: But *Socrates* having the Entire nature of humanity in him, is called *Homo*. He hath *integram naturam hominis in ſe*. There is nothing in humanity, which is not to be found in him: and therefore the name of man may well be given to him; he is an intire man. *Qui habet humanitatem in ſe integram, eſt homo*; Socrates *habet humanitatem in ſe integram, Ergo* Socrates *eſt homo*.

The ſecond thing to be obſerved concerning *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima*, is this concluſion which followeth.

Although *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima* cannot be divided into other *ſpecies*, yet it may be divided into members.

Socrates who is *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima* may alſo be conſidered as an *Integrum*, & ſo be divided into members. An individuall Vine cannot be divided into more *ſpecies*: but as it containeth root, body, and branches, it may be divided into members.

Divers reſpects may fall upon the ſame things, or may *concreſcere* and grow together upon the ſame ſubject. *Dialectica concreſcit cum ſeipſa, & cum aliis omnibus concreſcentibus*. A ſingular vine, as it beareth grapes, is *cauſa*: as it exiſts from its principles or cauſes it is an effect: as it ſtands in the vineyard it is an adjunct: as it containeth root, body and branches, there are *integrum & membra*: As it reſpects a vine *in genere*, it is *ſpecies*. The definition, rule and notion of *ſpecies* and *integrum* are different, *integrum* and *ſpecies* are diverſe and various Logical reſpects, which cannot be the ſame one with another; yet the ſame thing which is *integrum*, may alſo be *ſpecies*. Suppoſe a man ſhould reaſon thus, that vine which hath root, body, and branches, is an *in-*

tegrum

tegrum: this individual vine hath root, body, and branches; therefore this individual vine is an *integrum*. It may appear from hence, that which is *species ſpecialiſſima*, may be alſo *integrum*. And this may ſerve to make one of our former principles appear with greater clearneſs and evidence, *viz.* that the entire nature of the *genus* is in the *ſpecies*: the entire nature of a vine is in this individual vine. In like manner every individual church hath the entire nature of a church in it. An individual church is a *ſpecies*, as it reſpects a church in general, under which it is comprehended; yet as it containeth members, it is an integral. Hence it is that every individual church containeth members, becauſe it is an *integrum*; and yet is a *ſpecies* as it ſtands in reference to a Church *in genere*. Hence alſo a Church *in genere* may be ſaid to have members and officers in it, not conſidered under the nature of *Genus* (The Arguments of *Genus* and *Integrum* cannot be the ſame: *Genus* and *integrum* cannot be the ſame *in Actu ſignato*) but becauſe the *ſpecies ſpeci. liſſima* containeth members as it is *Integrum*; And this *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima* is comprehended under the *genus*. In this ſenſe a *Genus* may be truely ſaid to have officers in it. This Mr *Hudſon p.* 2. denieth, his words are, *A* Genus *is not capable of officers*. *A*. It is true *in actu ſignato*, but that which is *Genus*, comprehending the *ſpecies* and individualls which containe members, may in that reſpect be ſaid to comprehend members and officers. This may appear by obſerving ſome formes of reaſoning which may be propounded. *Ex. gr.* Every entire Eccleſiaſtical body politick containeth officers, & other members: *Boſton* Church is an entire, Eccleſiaſticall body politick; Therefore *Boſton* Church containeth officers and members. This Argumentation is *a genere ad ſpeciem*: An entire Eccleſiaſtical body politick is the *Genus*, and *Boſton* Church the *ſpecies*. This may ſerve to anſwer that Argument which Mr *Hudſon p.* 84. 85, 86. uſeth, to prove that the Church Catholike is an integral, taken from the ſeveral appellations which are given to the Church Catholike in ſcripture. *It is called a body, a kingdom, a tabernacle, a city, an army, a ſheepfold, a wheat field, a barn-floor, a drag-net, a loaf of bread. Now all theſe* (ſaith M. *Hudſon p.* 86.) *and many more appellations have no analogie to a* genus, *but to an* Integrum.

I anſwer, that thoſe and ſuch appellations are firſtly and properly appellations of an *integrum*, having *Analogie* to *Totum integrale*. But this *totum integrale* is *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima*; or every individuall Church being *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima*, is alſo an *integrum*, and containeth members: and the *genus* comprehending all his *ſpecies* under him, it comprehends the individualls with all their members under it, or within it ſelf. Hence thoſe appellations which are given to an individual Church, are given to the Church in General. *Quicquid affirmatur & negatur de ſpecie, etiam affirmatur & negatur de genere particulariter: Et quicquid eſſentiale affirmatur & negatur de genere, affirmatur etiam & negatur de ſpecie.*

If a Church be a body, then this or that individual Church is a body and all the members of it are συσσωμα one and the same body, of one and the same Corporation.

A Church is a bodie:

Boston congregation is a Church;

Therefore *Boston* congregation is a bodie.

Mr *Hudson p.* 84. saith that a *Genus* is no body.

Anſ. Yet a body or *Integrum* conſidered in *Genere* is *Genus*. Mr *Hooker p.* 85. doth not ſay that a *Genus* is a body, and the particular *ſpecies* are fitly joyned together and compacted, by that which every joynt ſupplyeth; as Mr *Hudſon* inſinuates: But Mr *Hooker p.* 268. affirmeth that the particular members of a congregation are compacted together, and where there are many particular Churches there is *Totum genericum exiſtens.*

I might ſay the like of the other appellations;

A Church is a Kingdom, Tabernacle, Temple, City, &c.

Boſton congregation is a Church;

Therefore *Boſton* congregation is a Kingdom, Tabernacle, Temple, Citie &c.

We have heard of the rules concerning *Genus*; we now proceed to the application of thoſe rules to the queſtion in hand, where we ſhall firſt return anſwer to Mr *Hudſon* his Arguments. Secondly propound reaſons tending to prove that a congregational Church is a Catholike Church.

Chapter IIII.

Containing an anſwer to Mr Hudſon *his Arguments propounded in his* fourth chapter; wherein he laboureth to prove, that the Church Catholicke viſible, is one Integral, or *Totum Integrale.*

I Cannot enlarge as I would; I ſhall therefore return a brief anſwer in theſe ſeveral concluſions following.

Conclusion I.

Totum genericum exiſtit in rerum naturâ. The general or Univerſal whole is really exiſting in nature. See the fifth Concluſion concerning the agreement between *Genus* & *Integrum.* This anſwers Mr *Hudſon* his firſt Argument *p.* 78, 79.

Conclusion II.

Totum genericum habet partes extra partes. See the firſt concluſion concerning the agreement of *Genus* and *integrum.* This anſwers Mr *Hudſon* his ſecond argument *p.* 79.

Con-

Conclusion III.

Individual Christians, which are not members of any particular congregation, are not formally politicall Church members. Visible saints are the matter of a visible Church; and in that respect may be said to be members *Materialiter*, but not *formaliter*; because they are not confederate. The woman of Canaan was a visible saint and beleever, yet was not formally a member of the *Jewish* Church: A proselyte was called *filius fœderis*, a son of the covenant.

A regenerate man excommunicated, is no Political Church member. The Apostles were members of the Church at Jerusalem, *Acts* 1. *vers.* 2, 3, 13, 14, &c. The Apostles had an extraordinary commission and influence into all Churches: But this is not sufficient to demonstrate that all Churches made one integral. This may serve to answer Mr *Hudsons* third Argument *p.* 79, 80.

Conclusion IIII.

A *Genus* is capable of inherent Accidents. See the third difference between *Genus* and *Integrum*.

A Church compacted according to the institution of Christ, is visible, beautifull, terrible.

Boston Church is compacted according to the institution of Christ;

Therefore *Boston* Church is visible, terrible, beautiful.

By this manner of reasoning, *a genere ad speciem*, it is evident that those accidents ro properties do firstly belong to the *genus*, or to a church *in genere*; and then to an individual Church, as a *species* of that *genus*.

A *genus* is also capable of being *majus* and *minus*, *in actu exercito*. Mankind is capable of increase: vertue shall increase at the calling of the Jewes: If humility, chastity, justice, faithfulness, and contentation (which are the *species* of vertue) shall increase, then vertue which is the *genus* shall increase; when injustice abounds (which is *species peccati*) *peccatum* (which is the *genus*) abounds: If the *species* be extended, the *genus* is extended also; *Quicquid affirmatur & negatur de specie, etiam affirmatur & negatur de genere particulariter*. That the *genus* may be mutable and fluxile, we have heard. See the first conclusion concerning the agreement of *genus* and *integrum*. *Genus* also is measurable by time and place. See conclusion fift concerning the agreement of *genus* and *Integrum*. These may answer Mr *Hudson* his fourth Argument. *p.* 80, 81.

Conclusion V.

A *genus* may be capable of admission and ejection of parts. See second Conclusion concerning *species specialissima*, wherein we may find an answer to Mr *Hudson* his fifth Argument *p.* 81. 82.

CONCLUSION VI.

A *Genus* may be capable of officers. See concluſion ſecond, concerning *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima.*

Every entire compleat Eccleſiaſtical ſociety or Church is furniſhed with officers.

Boſton congregation is a compleate intire Church, or a compleate Eccleſtiaſtical ſociety

Therefore *Boſton* Church is furniſhed with officers.

This is part of an anſwer to Mr *Hudſon* his ſixth Argument *p.* 82. I ſhall add a word more to fill up the anſwer.

There are no habituall officers in the Church: all officers in the Church are actuall officers. Habitual officers are *non Ens poſſibile, quod non eſt ſed poteſt eſſe.* Lawyers may in this ſenſe be called habitual officers of the Church, for they may officiate in a Church when they are called.

CONCLUSION VII.

The Church Catholike hath actions and operations of its own; it is true that it exiſts and acts in its Individualls, yet his properties are his owne, and ſo likewiſe are his operations. See the fourth difference between *Genus* and *Integrum.* This anſwers his ſeventh Argument *p.* 82.

CONCLUSION VIII.

The ſeveral Appellations which are given to the Church Catholike, are not a ſufficient demonſtration, that it is an Integrall. See concluſion ſecond concerning *ſpecies ſpecialiſſima.* This anſwereth Mr *Hudſon* his eighth Argument *p.*, 84 85. And alſo his ninth Argument *p.* 86, 87.

CONCLUSION IX.

The inviſible Church (not being diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral political bodies) may be an *Integrum:* yet the viſible political Church, diſtinguſhed into ſeveral congregations, may be a *genus*: and thoſe ſeveral congregations, the ſeveral *ſpecies.* The name of the whole may be given to one, and not to the other. A thouſand viſible beleevers in confœderation one with another, &c. may be called a viſible Church: But a thouſand inviſible ſaints cannot be called an inviſible Church. Here is no viſible political *vinculum* or bond to bind all Churches together in one Integral body. This may anſwer Mr *Hudſon* his tenth Argument. *p.* 87.

CONCLUSION X.

The Church covenant is not onely a covenant between man and man, but alſo between God and man. We read of *two ſtaves, Zach.* 11.7, 10, 14. *Beautie* and *Bands*: there was not onely a covenant between man and man, ſignifyed by *bands*; but alſo a covenant, which God made with his people, ſignifyed by his ſtaff, beauty. We may find this double covenant expreſt

Iſaiah 62.5.

Isaiah 62.5. *As a Bridegroom rejoyceth over the bride, so shall thy God rejoyce over thee.* Here is implyed a covenant between God and his people. And *as a young man marrieth a virgin, so shall thy sons marry thee.* There is implyed a covenant between man and man. When we enter into Church covenant, we binde our selves to God, and to our Bretheren, to walke with God and one with another, according to the rules of divine politie. We make not the Covenant between man and man the forme of the Church. Here Mr *Hudson* is mistaken: who affirmes, *that the covenant of particular congregations is a covenant between man and man: And this* (saith Mr *Hudson*) *we make the form of particular congregations.* See Mr *Hudson pag.* 90.

Conclusion XI.

Baptisme is an adjunct priviledge of a political Church member, as circumcision was a priviledge of the members of the *Iewish* Church; *Gen.* 17. Those *Acts* 2, were admitted into the Church, and then Baptized. they are said to *be Baptised in the name of the Lord Iesus*; not because the Apostles could alter the forme of *Baptisme prescribed* by Christ (they were to Baptise all *in the name of the Father, & in the name of the Son, & of the holy Ghost. Math.* 28. 19.) but because they submitted to the power of Christ in his Church and ordinances, and owned him for their Lord, and politicall head, and then were Baptised. The same expression also we find *Acts.* 10. 48. The Eunuch was a proselyte, a member of the *Iewish* Church. Obsignation with the initiall seale of Baptisme implyeth confœderation, and admission into the Church. Suppose a Master of Artes in one University, takes the same degree in another University, without repetition of his former degree, which is included in the second; this is no Argument that all Universities are members, and that there is one integral Universitys consisting of them all. A man that hath been Baptized in one Church, and received the Lords supper there, if he remove to another church and receive the Lords supper there, without repetition of his Baptisme (for that must not be repeated) this is no evidence, that there is one integral Church of which all Churches are members. This may serve to Answer that which Mr *Hudson* writes *pag.* 90. his apprehension is, *that a man who is no member of any particular congregation, may be Baptized.*

Conclusion XII.

A congregation may remove from one place to another, and yet be the same individual congregation. A man do h not vary his *species* as often as he varieth his place: A Church doth not vary its *species*, as often as it varieth its place; yet two distinct congregations, are distinct *species*, as two men are. This answers to that Question of M. *Hudson v.* 91.

Conclusion XIII.

Genus containing the common matter, and alſo the common forme of the *ſpecies*, becauſe the ſpeciall forme is a member of the *ſpecies*, the *genus* may be ſaid to contain the ſpecial forme, and to hold together the one with the other. A man may be ſaid to hold a ſword in his hand, when he holds only the hilt, haft, or handle in his hand. he holds the ſword by the handle, which is but a part of it. So likewiſe the *genus* holding the *ſpecies* by the common forme, which is but a part of the *ſpecies*, yet, becauſe the proper forme is another part, and joyned to it, the *genus* may be ſaid to contain the *ſpecies*: As *Homo* holdeth *Socrates* by his common forme of humanity, to which his proper forme of *Socrateity* being adjoyned, *Homo* holdeth *Socrates*, and ſo may be ſaid to contain individual men, which are his *ſpecies*. This may anſwer that which Mr *Hudſon* propounds *pag.* 95. *Totum eſſentiale ſive Genericum* doth not compriſe the forme of the *ſpecies* in it ſelf, but giveth the matter or common nature to the *ſpecies*.

I cannot but diſſent from Mr *Hudſon* his judgement concerning the conſtitution of the Catholicke Church, expreſſed in the next following words of the ſame *pag. viz. p.*95. The Church Catholike is made up of the matter and forme of the particular Churches conjoyned; as a whole houſe of the particular rooms in it. For Mr *Hudſon* ſaith that the Catholicke Church is firſt in eſſence: but a whole houſe is not firſt in eſſence, before the particular roomes of which it is made up. I never heard of a houſe conſiſting of ſeveral rooms, that was firſt made up of all the rooms in it, having the rooms made afterwards. One room may be made before a whole houſe conſiſting of ſeveral rooms; but it is impoſſible (I conceive) that the whole houſe containing all thoſe rooms, ſhould be made up before the ſeveral rooms are made.

Chap.

CHAPTER V.

Containing Arguments tending to demonstrate that a congregational Church is a Catholike Universal visible Church: wherein a few propositions are premised, by way of explication.

PROPOSITION I.

THE Church of Christ at Jerusalem was the mother of us all: the primitive Church out of which all the true visible Churches in the world have swarmed, *Gal.* 4. 25.

PROPOSITION II.

The Greek word ἐκκλησία (*Latine Concio*) in English, Church; in a *Theological* sence, is properly given to an Ecclesiasticall political body: for it signifies properly an assembly of *Citizens*, lawfully called together by a *Beadle, Town clark* or such like publick officer; to attend their civil affaires as in *Cambridge* the *Beadles* call a congregation; it is used *Acts.* 19. 32. 39. 41. translated assembly. It is taken therefore in the *Theologicall* use of it for an assembly of heavenly *Citizens* joyned together in a Politicall society and corporation, and meeting together according to divine institution, to worship Christ, and attend the affairs of his house and Kingdome.

A congregational Church is the proper subject of the rules of Ecclesiastical discipline and policie, which is to be guided to its publick felicity by the rules of divine policy; as a *Civil* society is guided by the rules of Civil policy to its Civil happiness This was one piece of the misery of the Ephesians and other Gentiles before their calling; they were not onely dead in sin, children of wrath by nature &c. for so were the Jewes, but they were also without Christ, as political head of the visible Church, and aliens from the policie of Israel. *Eph.* 2. 12. The ground of it we find in the same place, and that is, they were strangers from the Covenants: that is, from the Church Covenant, which is not only a Covenant between God and man, but also between man and man; and was often renued in the old Testament: and for those reasons especially, it is called Covenants in the plural number; and from thence followed a double misery: first, that they were without those faire hopes and possibilities of the good things promised,

2. And without the worship of God or ordinances of divine worship, which the Jewes had, being Church members.

PROPOSITION III.

All the viſible Churches of the Goſpel, which are the genuine Children of that primitive Church, are political bodies. *Viſibilis dicitur eccleſia propter ordinem eccleſiaſticum, ac formam exteriorem, ac viſibilem, -qua quidem fecit, ut eccleſia ſit, et dicatur viſibilis : Sohnius.*

Sohnius Scrip. Method.

PROPOSITION IV.

The Catholike Viſible Church is to be found in the Churches of the Goſpel, and in the dayes of Chriſt. Before his exhibition there was a domeſtical Church, and a national Church, but no Catholike Church; which is oppoſed to the Jewiſh Church. The Church was firſt in families, and then *in populo*, and that was either *in populo Iſraelitico*, or *Catholico*: when the Son of God himſelf came into the world, it was too light a buſineſs for him to raiſe up the Tribes of Iſrael, but he muſt be a light to the Gentiles, and ſalvation to the end of the earth: He muſt haue his Honours, and Royal Houſes, and keep his Court among all nations. The Church is not confined to *Judea*, or limited to any part or corner of the earth, but may be extended far and wide over all the world. Therefore the Field is called the world.

PROPOSITION V.

The name Catholike doth moſt properly agree to a generical Church, to a church as the *genus* of al churches. *Integrum*, an integral whole, or *totum*, is called ὅλον & σωόλον but *totum genericum*, or *genus* is properly called τὸ καθόλυ A generical whole is properly called catholike and univerſal: *genus* and *univerſale* are all one and the ſame notion; an integral church may be called a whole church, or (if you will) a ſynholick church, but not ſo properly a catholike church.

PROPOSITION VI.

A congregationall church is a catholike generical church, the *genus* of all churches in the world. A church or congregation is the *Genus* of all congregations; and the ſeveral churches and individual congregations, as *Boſton* church, *Capel* church, *Hartford* church, are the *ſpecies* of church *in genere*.

REASON I.

That which comunicates his whole eſſence to *Boſton* church, *Capel* church, and all individual churches, is a catholike generical univerſal church, and the *genus* of thoſe individuals:

A congregational church communicates his whole eſſence to *Boſton* church, *Capell* church, &c.

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, generical univerſall church, and the *genus* of theſe individuals.

The *major* is clear at the firſt ſight, if we conſider the definition of *genus*, which is *totum partibus eſſentiale*. The *genus* is that which is eſſential, *i. e.* that which

which communicats his whole essence consisting of matter & form, to his parts.

The *minor* is apparent, for a congregational church communicates his whole essence, his matter and form to *Boston* church, and the whole essence of a visible, political congregational church is found *in Boston* church, and in all true churches and faithful congregations of Christ.

There are visible saints which are the matter of a church: we read of Saints at *Rome*, *Corinth*, &c. and all churches are churches of the saints; 1 *Cor.* 14. 33. these are the materials of this glorious Temple. Saints are men separated from the world, dedicated unto God. This is the glory of a congregation to be of such glorious materials. It is a pleasant sight to see churches filled with such men; with men that know God, and love God, having derived a principle of life from Christ by faith. All church members must be visible saints, having a competent measure of knowledge, and blameless life: *Mat.* 5. 19. *Rev.* 22. 14.

1. There is also a confœderation, either explicite or implicite; whereby church members stand bound to walk with God, and one with another in the wayes of the worship of Christ, according to the rules of divine policie. An explicite covenant is not essential to a church, because explicitness is but an adjunct of the covenant: and because Christ hath had visible churches in all ages since the primitive church, and yet an explicite covenant cannot be found in all ages; yet it is to be desired, and there is much of the visible glory of Christ appearing in it: when men visibly bind themselves, and their children also to Christ, they cannot bind them to a better Master. *Isaiah* 44. 5. All Jacobs Children were inrolled in the catologue of the church.

REASON II.

That *totum* which giveth his name to *Boston* Church, *Capel* church, and all individual churches, is a catholike, generical, universal church, and the *genus* of all those churches.

A congregational church giveth his name to *Boston* church, *Capel* church, and all individual churches:

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches.

It is true (which M. Hudson speaks, pag. 90.) that every visible beleever is a christian; and it is as true, that a christian is a generical, and *Paul* an individual christian, and these are *genus* and *species*.

Every church member is a member of Christ his Kingdom, because every church is a Kingdom of Christ.

We have proved that *pars similaris* is *species*; and that *aqua*, and *hac aqua*, are *genus* and *species*; and that it is the peculiar prerogative of the *genus* to communicate his name with his nature to his *species*.

Integrum cannot communicate his whole essence to every member; for

then there would be so many men in every man, as there are fingers, and toes, and members in his body. Therefore every finger, and toe, and member cannot be called by the name of a man. The members of a man, being essential to him, make him a man: but a man cannot communicate his whole humanity to all his members, and make them so many men. It is most just and meete therefore, that a mans finger, not being a man, should want the name and title of a man, because such names must be given to things as may hold proportion with their natures.

Minor, *Boston* church, *Capel* church, and every individual church, is a congregational church, and is called by the name of a church or congregation. Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, universal church, and the *genus* of all churches.

REASON 3.

There is a *genus* of all individual churches:

There is no *genus* of individual churches, but only a congregational church;

Therefore a congregational church is the *genus* of all individual churches.

Their community of nature is an evidence that they have a *genus*, and are comprehended under some more general head: and there is no other next *genus*, but only a congregational church; I speake only of their next *genus*: for a body politick is *genus generalissimum*, or a higher and more general *genus*.

REASON 4.

If all individual churches are *species*, a congregational church is the *genus* of all individual churches:

But all individual churches are *species*;

Therefore a congregational church is the *genus* of all individual churches.

That all individual churches are *species*, is evident, because all individuals are *species*, as wee haue proved in the first conclusion concerning *species specialissima*

REASON 5.

If all individual churches are *ejusdem generis*, and are distinguished specifically one from another, a congregational church is a catholike generical universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches:

But all individual churches are *ejusdem generis*, and are distinguished specifically one from another;

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, generical, universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches.

They are all *ejusdem generis*, of the same kind, being all congregational churches; *Boston* church is a congregational church, *Capel* church and *Hartford* church are of the same kind.

All

All have the same general matter and form, the same ordinances and officers *de jure*, they differ not one from another in their general kind, having all the same common nature, and that they are distinguished specifically one from another; is as evident *Boston* church, *Hartford* church, *Capel* church, are *disparata*, and therefore *opposita*, and essentially distinguished one from another; it is impossible that one should be the other. The assembly of saints at *Philippi* are not essentially the same with those at *Ephesus*; those at *Ephesus* are not the same with those at *Corinth*. We have proved before that individuals are really, formally and essentially distinguished one from another.

REASON 6.

If a congregational church communicate all his essential properties or proper adjuncts to individual churches, a congregational church is a catholike generical, universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches:

But a congregational church communicates all his essential properties or proper adjuncts to individual churches;

Therefore a congregational church is a catholike, generical universal church, and the *genus* of all individual churches.

The *integrum* doth not communicate all his propeties to every members; a mans finger is not *risible*, is not indued with a power of laughter: But the *genus* comunicating his whole essence, communicates all his essential properties to his *species*, as we have heard.

A congregational church communicates all his essential properties to individual churches. Ecclesiastical ordinances, Officers, Seales, and Censures, are the proper priviledges of a congregational church.

And all these are to be found there.

All the springs of God are there *Psal.* 87. 7. there we may meet with Jehovah himself the first being. All the water in springs is derived from the sea by secret pipes and channels under the Earth. The first being is an infinite sea of being and goodness, and he communicates himself, and poureth out most glorious sweet influences of himself in his own ordinances, and wayes of his own appointment, and those who wait upon him herein, may drink of the Rivers of Eden, *Psal.* 36. 8. *one day here is better then a thousand. Psal.* 84. 10.

It is cleare from this discourse: there is no catholike, integral, political church: for an *integrum* is *species specialissima*, and cannot be divided into *species*, as wee see the catholike church is. And therefore I shall add no more for the present.

FINIS.

ERRATA. In the Epistle, *page* 4. *l. ult. read* consultative. *p.* 6. *l.* 38. *r. quæ. p.* 17. *l.* 2. *r.* invitation, *p.* 21. *l.* 18. *for* it, *r.* is. *p.* 37. *l.* 26. *r.* Universty.